Cooperation Databank (CoDa) – Codebook

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Codebook of Common Study Variables

The following variables have been annotated for each study

Concept	Concept Definition	Values	Values Definition
Paper Meta-data			
Published	Whether a study was published or not.	Published article	Study was reported in a published document
		Doctoral Dissertation	Study was reported in a doctoral dissertation
		Working paper	Study was reported in a working paper
		Master's thesis	Study was reported in a master's thesis
		Raw data	Study was coded from raw data
Sample Characteristics			
Academic discipline	Participant's field of study if the participant is a student.	Other	Other
		Economics	Economics
		Psychology	Psychology
		Mixed	Mixed
		Sociology	Sociology

Concept	Concept Definition	Values	Values Definition
Acquaintance	Whether participants were interacting (and were aware of it) with people that they are not acquainted with or with people that they knew outside of the laboratory (e.g., friends, relatives, parents, romantic partners).	Strangers	Their partner was a stranger
		Possible Acquaintance	Their partner was neither a complete stranger or an acquaintance. For example, participants were playing as part of a classroom exercise, so even if they were matched with strangers, there was a chance they know each other and they were not playing with total strangers in strict sense. Also, when participants were recruited from a small-scale society or were members of a small community, so again there was a chance they might know each other or make use of the reputational information of that community
		Acquaintance	Their partner has a relationship with the participant (e.g., acquaintance, spouse, friend, relative).

Concept	Concept Definition	Values	Values Definition
Country or region	Country where the data collection took place (coded with the 3-letter country code following ISO 3166-1 alpha-3). This variable can overlap with participant's nationality.		
Highest age	Maximum age of all sampled participants.		
Lowest age	Minimum age of all sampled participants.		
Mean age	Participants' mean age in years (after exclusion of participants, when that information was reported).		
Proportion of males	Proportion of male participants in the sample of a study (after exclusion of participants, when that information was reported).		
Recruitment method	The way participants were recruited to take part in the study.	Participant pool	Participants were recruited from a participant pool which includes participants enrolled in a class or at the university, such as through ORSEE or SONA.
		MTurk	Mechanical Turk (MTurk)
		Other	Other
Source of country or region	Source of the country where the data collection took place.	Specified country	The paper explicitly states that data have been collected at a certain location (e.g., University, lab, and/or participants pool)
		Most authors	The majority of the authors are affiliated to the same institution in a specific country or region
		All authors	The paper does not specify the country or region, but all authors are affiliated to the same institution in a specific country (indicate it for single-authored papers)

Concept	Concept Definition	Values	Values Definition
		Multiple countries	The paper specifies that most participants come from a specific country or region, but that a smaller percentage come from different countries (we indicate the percentages and nationalities in a note, if the information is available)
Source of year of data collection	Source of information about what year the data was collected.	Received/Submitted	When the paper was received/Submitted to a journal
		Conducted	When the study was conducted
		Published	When the paper was published
		Accepted	When the paper was accepted for publication
		Presented	When the study was presented at a meeting
		Working paper published	When a working paper was published
		Available online	When the data was available online

Concept	Concept Definition	Values	Values Definition
Student sample	Whether participants were recruited from a student population. TRUE = Participants were recruited from a student population, FALSE = Participants were not recruited from a student population.	[bool]	-
Total N	Total sample size in a single study after exclusion of participants.	[int]	-
Year of data collection	Year when the data was collected. If the information was not reported in the paper, the variable indicates the closest year to data collection.	[int]	-
Study Characteristics			
Continuous vs step-level public goods	Whether there was a provision point for contributions to establish a public good (i.e., step-level public goods) versus each contribution provided an incremental benefit to the public good (i.e., continuous public good).	Continuous	In the continuous public goods game, subjects are provided an endowment and decide any portion to allocate to the public good, and the remaining about is kept for themselves. The group contributions in the public pool are multiplied by a factor (greater than one and less than the number of players, N) and it is divided among players, regardless of the players contributions
		Step-level	In the step level public goods game, subjects are provided an endowment and decide any portion of the endowment to allocate to the public good, and the remaining amount is kept for themselves. The group contributions to the public pool are multiplied by a factor and it is divided among players (regardless of their contributions) only if a certain threshold (provision point) is met

Concept	Concept Definition	Values	Values Definition
Deception	Whether deception was applied in the study. TRUE = deception was applied, FALSE = deception was not applied.		
Discussion	Whether communication was allowed between participants in the game.	Uni-directional	Participants were allowed to send messages or communicate with other participants, but those participants were not allowed to respond to that communication (i.e., uni-directional communication)
		Absent	Communication was not allowed
		Bi-directional	Participants were allowed to send messages or communicate with other participants, and those participants could respond to that communication (i.e., bi-directional communication)
Experimental setting	The setting in which the experiment was conducted.	Lab	The experiment was conducted in a laboratory (Classrooms used as laboratory setting are considered as lab)
		Class	The experiment was conducted during a regular class (e.g., during some demonstration of a negotiation task for teaching purposes)
		Online	The experiment was conducted online on a web platform (e.g., MTurk)
		Lab in the field	The experiment had all the characteristics of a lab experiment but it is carried out at a field site
		Field	The experiment involved a manipulation carried out in the field (Subjects may or may not be aware that they are part of an experiment)

Concept	Concept Definition	Values	Values Definition
		Natural experiment	A quasi-experiment in the field in which randomization is not controlled by the experimenter (e.g., a study using a TV game show)
		Other	Other experimental setting not included in the defined categories
Game incentive	Whether participants' decisions in the game determine their payoffs in different forms.	Hypothetical	Decisions in the game resulted in outcomes with hypothetical value for participants (e.g., points)
		Monetary	Decisions in the game resulted in monetary outcomes, often converted from game points
		Non-monetary	Decisions in the game resulted in outcomes involving some amount of non-monetary material resource (e.g., candies, school supplies)
		Monetary lottery	Decisions in the game resulted in monetary outcomes gained through a lottery, often converted from game points
		Non-monetary lottery	Decisions in the game resulted in outcomes involving some amount of non-monetary material resource (e.g., candies, school supplies) gained through a lottery

Concept	Concept Definition	Values	Values Definition
Game type	Economic game that participants play during the experimental session.	Public Goods Game	In the continuous public goods game, subjects are provided an endowment and decide any portion to allocate to the public good, and the remaining amount is kept for themselves. The group contributions in the public pool are multiplied by a factor (greater than one and less than the number of players, N) and it is divided among players, regardless of the players contributions. In the step level public goods game, subjects are provided an endowment and decide any portion of the endowment to allocate to the public good, and the remaining amount is kept for themselves. The group contributions to the public pool are multiplied by a factor and it is divided among players (regardless of their contributions) only if a certain threshold (provision point) is met
		Other	Other game types not included in the defined categories (e.g., Intergroup games).
		Resource Dilemma	In the standard resource dilemma game, players harvest resources from a common resource pool of known size, and after each trial the pool is replenished at a predetermined rate and is exhausted when the withdrawals exceed the resource in the pool
		Prisoner's Dilemma Game	In the standard prisoner's dilemma game, the relative value of the four outcomes reflects the following relationships: DC > CC > DD > CD

Concept	Concept Definition	Values	Values Definition
Group size	Overall number of people affected by the choices in the game.	[int]	-
Highest choice option	Highest choice option allowed to participants. The value of the highest choice option. Is '1' in a binary choice between non-numeric options (such as 'cooperate' vs. 'defect'; 'C' vs. 'D').	[int]	-
K index	For 2-persons PDG, it is calculated as (R-P)/(T-S), and $0 < K < 1$. For N-persons PDG, it is calculated as (A(n)-B(0))/(0(max)-0(min)), and $0 < K < 1$.	[double]	-
Known endgame	Whether participants know the exact number of trials at the beginning of the experiment. Endgame is considered known also when participants played a one-shot game. TRUE = Known endgame, FALSE = Endgame not known.	[bool]	-
Lowest choice option	Lowest choice option allowed to participants. The value of the lowest choice option. Is '0' in a binary choice between non-numeric options (such as 'cooperate' vs. 'defect'; 'C' vs. 'D').	[int]	-
Matching	How participants are paired with others during interactions.	Stranger	Participants interact with one person for one trial (i.e., one-shot), or switch partners after each trial across many trials (i.e., one-shot repeated)
		Partner	Participants interact with the same partner for multiple trials

Concept	Concept Definition	Values	Values Definition
MPCR	The ratio of benefits to costs for a member to contribute one monetary unit to the group account. Calculated as multiplier divided by group size.	[double]	-
Number of choices	The number of choice options players have when making the contribution. Is '2' when making a binary choice (such as cooperate vs. defect); (n+1) for continuous measure of cooperation; 3 for 3-choice Prisoner's Dilemma, etc.	[int]	-
One-shot vs repeated	Whether participants played the game with the same person only once (this also applies if participants switch partners after each trial) versus played the game repeatedly with the same person.	Repeated	Participants played the game repeatedly with the same person
		One-shot	Participants played the game with the same person only once
Other game type	If none of the game type categories apply, then we report the name of the game included in the study.		
Real partner	Whether participants interact with real or imagined participants in the game.	Real	Participants involved in real-time interactions with real participant(s)
		Hypothetical	Participants imagined interactions with others or played with a computer
		Deception	Participants believe that they are interacting with real participants, but experimenter strategy was used

Concept	Concept Definition	Values	Values Definition
Repeated one-shot game	Whether participants are paired with different partner(s) after each trial across many trials. TRUE = repeated one-shot, FALSE = one-shot.	[bool]	-
Replenishment rate	The replenishment rate in the resource dilemma. The remaining resource in the common pool is multiplied by the replenishment rate after each trial.	[double]	-
Sanction	Whether a sanction (punishment or reward) mechanism was in place in the game. TRUE = sanction was present, FALSE = sanction was absent.	[bool]	-
Sequentiality	Whether group members make their decisions simultaneously or sequentially, i.e., whether participants take decisions one after another while receiving some form of feedback about preceding decisions.	Simultaneous	Participants make decisions simultaneously
		Sequential turn-taking	Participants make decisions one after another following some (endogenous or exogenous) order
Show-up fee	Whether participants received a show-up fee for the study (i.e., a certain payment for participation).	Paid	Participants received a monetary payment as show-up fee
		Course credit	Participants received course credit as show-up fee
		Non-monetary	Participants received a non-monetary payment as show-up fee
		Absent	Participants did not receive a show-up fee

Concept	Concept Definition	Values	Values Definition
Symmetry	Whether specific aspects of the game that were different (i.e., asymmetric) for participants. TRUE = Symmetric, FALSE = Asymmetric.	[bool]	-
Threshold	The minimum threshold of total contribution by all group members when the public good will be provided. This also defines the criticality of contributions, as contributions are more critical if other players cannot reach the threshold on their own (e.g. in sequential games where others' prior contributions are known).	[int]	-
Quantitative Study Results			
Overall proportion of cooperation	Cooperative behavior for games (e.g. prisoner's dilemma and public goods game) with two choice options. Higher numbers equal higher cooperation.	[double]	-
Overall mean of withdrawals	Withdrawal behavior when the game type is a resource dilemma and the maximum choice range is about two. Higher numbers equate to lower cooperation.	[double]	-
Overall mean of contributions	Cooperative behavior when the game (e.g., prisoner's dilemma and public goods dilemma) had a maximum number of choices greater than two. Higher numbers equate to higher cooperation. For resource dilemmas, it should be calculated as: upper choice range - overall M withdrawal + lower choice range.	[double]	-
Overall standard deviation of contributions or withdrawals	Standard deviation of contributions or withdrawals, only applicable when maximum number of choices is greater than two.	[double]	-

Concept	Concept Definition	Values	Values Definition
Percentage of endowment contributed	Percentage of endowment contributed, calculated as (M - Lower choice option) / (Upper choice option – Lower choice option).	[double]	-
Trial of cooperation	Trial on which cooperation was assessed.	All trials	Cooperation was assessed across all trials
		First trial	Cooperation was assessed in the first trial
		Other trials	Cooperation was assessed in other trials
		First and last trials	Cooperation was assessed in the first and the last trials
		Last trial	Cooperation was assessed in the last trial
Reported Statistical Analyses			
Number of observations	This variable is used as sample size to compute variance for meta-regressions predicting cooperation. It corresponds to the total sample size in a single study after exclusion of participants (N), but it uses the number of observations for studies that uses both individual and groups as unit of analysis (e.g., interindividual-intergroup discontinuity studies).	[int]	-
Published vs unpublished	Whether the treatment or effect size quantitative information was published. TRUE = The treatment or effect size came from published information, FALSE = The treatment or effect size was calculated from raw data or requested to authors.	[bool]	-
Between versus within participants design	Whether the variable was manipulated using a between-participants versus within-participants experimental design.	Between-participants experimental design	Between-participants experimental design
		Within-participants experimental design	Within-participants experimental design

Concept	Concept Definition	Values	Values Definition
Manipulated versus measured independent variable	Whether the independent variable was experimentally manipulated or measured.	Measured	The variable was measured (e.g., self-report scale)
		Manipulated	The variable was manipulated and participants were exposed to different levels of the variable (e.g., experimental designs)
Behavior used as DV	The type of cooperative behavior used as a dependent variable.		Cooperative behavior when game (e.g., prisoner's dilemma or public goods dilemma) had a maximum of two choice options. Higher numbers equal higher cooperation. Cooperative behavior when game (e.g. prisoner's dilemma or public goods dilemma) has a maximum number of choices great than two. Higher numbers equal higher cooperation. Withdrawal behavior when game type is a resource dilemma and with a maximum choice range greater than two. Higher numbers equal lower cooperation.
Trial on which the DV was assessed	The trial on which cooperative behavior was assessed.	All trials	All trials
		Other trials	Other trials
		First trial	First trial
		First and last trials	First and last trials
		Last trial	Last trial

Concept	Concept Definition	Values	Values Definition
DV expressed in percentage of endowment	Whether cooperation was coded as a percentage of endowment. TRUE = Percentage, FALSE = Mean.	[bool]	-
Type of effect	Whether the reported results were main effects of specific variables or interactions between two or more variables.	Main effect	Main effect
		Interaction	Interaction effect
		Main effect, independent subsamples	Main effect computed on independent subsamples
		Main effect, dependent subsamples	Main effect computed on dependent subsamples
Number of levels	The number of levels or conditions that were coded for an independent variable (coded as N/A if a correlation was reported with a measured variable).	[int]	-
Level of analysis	The level at which the data were analyzed (e.g., individual or group-based analyses).	Trial	Data were analyzed at the trial level, so that cooperation for each trial is used as observation in the analysis
		Block	Data were analyzed at the block level, so that cooperation for each block is used as observation in the analysis
		Subject	Data were analyzed at the subject level, so that cooperation displayed by each participant is used as observation in the analysis
		Group	Data were analyzed at the group level, so that cooperation displayed by each group as a whole is used as observation in the analysis

Concept	Concept Definition	Values	Values Definition
		Session	Data were analyzed at the session level, so that cooperation displayed in each experimental session is used as observation in the analysis
		Other	Data were analyzed at a level of analysis not included among the level of analysis categories
Test statistic	A statistic is a measurement datum to describe a dataset or a variable. It is generated by a calculation on set of observed data. Definition extracted from STATO (the statistical methods ontology).	F	F statistic
		t	t statistic
		X	Chi-square statistic
		r	Pearson's correlation
		B	Standardized regression coefficient (beta)
		b	Unstandardized regression coefficient
		z	Z statistic
		H	Kruskal-Wallis H statistic
		U	Mann-Whitney U statistic
		W	Wilcoxon signed-rank test
		E	Fisher's exact test
		rho	Spearman's rank correlation coefficient
		W-X	Wald Chi-square statistic
		KS	Kolmogorov-Smirnov test
		G2	G-square or delta G-square
		M-X	McNemar test Chi-square statistic
		tau	Kendall's tau
		E-S	Epps–Singleton

Concept	Concept Definition	Values	Values Definition
Numerator degrees of freedom	From STATO: The degree of freedom numerator is the number of degrees of freedom that the estimate of variance used in the numerator is based on.	[int]	-
Denominator degrees of freedom	From STATO: The degree of freedom denominator is the number of degrees of freedom that the estimate of variance used in the denominator is based on.	[int]	-
Value of the test statistic	The numeric value of the test statistic indicated by 'Test'.	[double]	-
p-value	From STATO: A quantitative confidence value that represents the probability of obtaining a result at least as extreme as that actually obtained, assuming that the actual value was the result of chance alone.	[double]	-
Direction of effect	The direction of a comparison between two treatments.	Negative	Level 1 > level 2
		Positive	Level 2 > level 1

Concept	Concept Definition	Values	Values Definition
Measure of the reported effect size	For effect sizes reported in the original paper, the effect size measure.	[string]	-
Reported effect size	The standardized effect size estimate reported in the manuscript.	[double]	-
Sample size in the experimental condition	Sample size in the experimental condition. If this is not reported, we assume equal sample size across conditions. Also, for within-subject comparison we code the number of participants in each condition, and not number of observations.	[int]	-
Proportion of cooperation in the experimental condition	Proportion of cooperative choices in the experimental condition. Proportions are reported when the game (e.g., prisoner's dilemma or public goods dilemma) had a maximum number of two choice options. Higher numbers equal higher cooperation.	[double]	-
Mean contributions/withdrawals in the experimental condition	Mean of cooperative or withdrawal behavior in the experimental condition. Means are reported when there was a maximum number of choices greater than two.	[double]	-
Standard deviation in the experimental condition	Standard deviation of contributions or withdrawals in the experimental condition. Only applicable when maximum number of choices is greater than two.	[double]	-
Percentage of endowment contributed in the experimental condition	Percentage of endowment contributed, calculated as (M - Lower choice option) / (Upper choice option – Lower choice option).	[double]	-

Concept	Concept Definition	Values	Values Definition
Log-transformed proportion of endowment contributed / rate of cooperation	The log-transformed proportion of the endowment contributed / rate of cooperation.	[double]	-
Coefficient of variation	Coefficient of variation.	[double]	-
Comments from Annotators			
Comments from annotators	Annotators used comments sometimes to communicate some specific aspects of how a study was coded. This was originally intended to be for other annotators, but we have now decided to make this information public in case it will be useful to users of the databank.	[string]	-
Description of the independent variables	Annotators were requested to provide a written description of the independent variables in the study. This was originally intended to be for other annotators, but we have now decided to make this description public information in case it will be useful to users of the databank.	[string]	-
Other variables measured	Annotators were requested to list other variables that were measured in the study. This was originally intended to be for other annotators, but we have now decided to make this information public in case it will be useful to users of the databank.	[string]	-

Codebook of Study-specific Variables

The following variables have been annotated only for specific studies that manipulated or measured such variables

Concept	Concept Definition	Values	Values Definition
Acquaintance			
Degree of friendship	Correlation between cooperation and the extent to which the participant and their partner(s) in the game describe themselves as friends.	[bool]	-
*Relationship with the partner	The type of relationship between the participant and their partner.	Stranger	Their partner is a stranger
		Sibling	Their partner is a sibling
		Spouse	Their partner is a spouse
		Friend	Their partner is a friend
		Acquaintance	Their partner is an acquaintance
		Parent	Their partner is a parent
		Son/Daughter	Their partner is a son/daughter
Age			
Age	Participants' age, usually measured as self-reported participants' person years.	[bool]	
Age cohort	Participants were grouped in different age categories. Coded as reported in the paper, since each study can employ its own grouping criterion (e.g., via a median split).	Young	Participants were classified as young with respect to their age
		Middle	Participants were classified as middle with respect to their age
		Old	Participants were classified as middle old with respect to their age

Concept	Concept Definition	Values	Values Definition
Anchor			
Anchor	Participants are given a suggested level of contribution.	High cooperation	Participants are provided a suggestion to contribute a relatively high amount to the public good
		Medium cooperation	Participants are provided a suggestion to contribute a relatively medium amount to the public good
		Low cooperation	Participants are provided a suggestion to contribute a relatively low amount to the public good
		Absent	Participants are not provided any suggested level of contribution
Behavior in the Game			
Participant's own behavior (correlation)	Correlation between participant's behavior at two different time points (e.g., current trials and past trials).	[bool]	-
Participant's behavior level	Whether participants or groups are classified or grouped according to their cooperative behavior (cooperative/high contributions vs competitive/low contributions) in early stage of the games or in other games.	Low	Participants or groups are classified as displaying a low cooperative behavior
		Medium	Participants or groups are classified as displaying a medium cooperative behavior
		High	Participants or groups are classified as displaying a high cooperative behavior

Concept	Concept Definition	Values	Values Definition
Partner's behavior (correlation)	Correlation between participant and other(s) behavior.	[bool]	-
Partner's behavior level	Whether other players are classified or grouped according to their cooperative behavior (cooperative/high contributions vs competitive/low contributions) in early stage of the games or in other games.	Low	Other players are classified as displaying a low cooperative behavior
		Medium	Other players are classified as displaying a medium cooperative behavior
		High	Other players are classified as displaying a high cooperative behavior
Choices			
*Number of choices	The number of choice options players have when making the contribution. Is '2' when making a binary choice (such as cooperate vs. defect); (n+1) for continuous measure of cooperation; 3 for 3-choice Prisoner's Dilemma, etc.	[int]	-
Number of choices level	Relative level of the number of choice options players have when making the contribution.	Low	Low relative level of the number of choice options players have when making the contribution
		Medium	Medium relative level of the number of choice options players have when making the contribution
		High	High relative level of the number of choice options players have when making the contribution
*Lowest choice option	Lowest choice option allowed to participants. The value of the lowest choice option. Is '0' in a binary choice between non-numeric options (such as 'cooperate' vs. 'defect'; 'C' vs. 'D').	[int]	-
Lowest choice option level	Relative level of the lowest choice option allowed to participants.	Low	Low relative level of the lowest choice option allowed to participants
		Medium	Medium relative level of the lowest choice option allowed to participants

Concept	Concept Definition	Values	Values Definition
		High	High relative level of the lowest choice option allowed to participants
*Highest choice option	Highest choice option allowed to participants. The value of the highest choice option. Is '1' in a binary choice between non-numeric options (such as 'cooperate' vs. 'defect'; 'C' vs. 'D').	[int]	-
Highest choice option level	Relative level of the highest choice option allowed to participants.	Low	Low relative level of the highest choice option allowed to participants
		Medium	Medium relative level of the highest choice option allowed to participants
		High	High relative level of the highest choice option allowed to participants

Concept	Concept Definition	Values	Values Definition
Exit option	Whether the game provided the option to walk away and not interact in the game. TRUE = Exit option is provided, FALSE = Exit option is not provided	[bool]	-
Cognitive Load			
Cognitive load treatment	Participants are exposed to a treatment aimed at increasing their cognitive load before the game (e.g., the Stroop Task). TRUE = cognitive load treatment, FALSE = Participants are not exposed to the cognitive load manipulation or are exposed to a filler control task that should not affect their cognitive load or should affect it less (e.g., a Stroop Task that requires less cognitive resources)	[bool]	-
Communication			
*Communication treatment	Whether communication was allowed between participants in the game. TRUE = Participants could communicate in the game, FALSE = Participants could not communicate in the game.	[bool]	-
Communication type	The mode of communication between participants in the game.	Verbal	Participate could speak to each other, either in person or via phone/voice chat
		Written	Participants could communicate via written messages (either using free text entry or pre-written messages)
		Nonverbal	Other modes of communication, including nonverbal eye gaze, touch, and sound
Communication occurrence	Whether, in an iterated game, agents could communicate only once or throughout the experiment, such as before every trial.	One-shot	Participants could only communicate once, before the first trial of the game
		Ongoing	Participants could communicate before multiple (all, or at least several) trials (If the game was one-shot, then communication was coded as ongoing)

Concept	Concept Definition	Values	Values Definition
Restricted communication	Whether communication is restricted to pre-specified messages, or participants are free to formulate their own messages. TRUE = Communication restricted to pre-specified messages, FALSE = Free communication.	[bool]	-
Communication content	What was the content of communication, either given by pre-specified messages or coded from free communication.	Irrelevant	Messages irrelevant to the game
		Threat	Threats (e.g., of non-cooperation or punishment)
		Promise	Promises (e.g., of own cooperation or reward)
		Request	Requests and suggestions (e.g., to cooperate or contribute)
		Other	Other content of messages
		N/A	If communication was not restricted, communication content is not coded.

Concept	Concept Definition	Values	Values Definition
Optional communication	Whether participants had a choice to communicate (or not) with their partner. TRUE = Optional communication, FALSE = Mandatory communication.	[bool]	-
Real communication	Whether the communication received by participants was real or fake. TRUE = Real communication, FALSE = Fake communication.	[bool]	-
Criticality			
Perceived criticality	Correlation between cooperation and subjective estimates that one's contribution is critical to providing the public good (referred to as "self-efficacy" in some studies).	[bool]	-
Criticality level	Different objective or subjective understanding that the participant's decision is more or less critical in providing the public good.	Absent	Baseline. A comparison to treatments that provide information that manipulate participants (objective or subjective) criticality of behavior in providing a public good
		Low	Participants have relatively low amounts of criticality in providing the public good
		Medium	Participants have relatively medium amounts of criticality in providing the public good
		High	Participants have relatively high amounts of criticality in providing the public good
Degree of conflicting interests			
*Conflict index	Index that quantifies the degree of conflicting interests in the game.	K index	For 2-persons PDG, it is calculated as (R-P)/(T-S), and $0 < K < 1$.
		K*-index	For N-persons PDG, it is calculated as (A(n)-B(0))/(0(max)-0(min)), and $0 < K < 1$
		b/c ratio	Ratio between the cost c paid by a cooperator, and the correspondent benefit b received by the partner

Concept	Concept Definition	Values	Values Definition
		S/T ratio	It is calculated as the index log (T-S)/(R-P)
		Index of competitive advantage	It is calculated as S-T
		Average advantage of competition	It is calculated as (T+P)/2-(R+S)/2
		Index of correspondence	It is calculated as the correlation between the row and the column players' outcomes
		g index	Index that identifies the strength of the underlying structural impetus toward cooperation or competition in repeated, multitrial PD tasks with probabilistic endpoints. Their expected gain index, g = (1/(1 - p)][R - T + p(T -P)], where p is the probability that play will continue (Bettenhausen & Murnighan, 1991)
		R' index	It is calculated as (R-S)/(T-S)
		r index	It is calculated as (R–S) / [(R−S) + (T−P)] (Au et al., 2012)
		Other	None of the conflict index categories apply
Conflict index value	Numeric value of the specific conflict index.	[double]	-
Conflict level	Relative level of the conflict of interests in the game.	Low	Low relative level of the conflict of interests in the game
		Medium	Medium relative level of the conflict of interests in the game
		High	High relative level of the conflict of interests in the game

Concept	Concept Definition	Values	Values Definition
Education			
*Student sample	Whether participants were recruited from a student population. TRUE = Participants were recruited from a student population, FALSE = Participants were not recruited from a student population.	[bool]	
*Academic discipline	Participant's field of study if the participant is a student.	Economics	Participants were economics students
		Psychology	Participants were psychology students
		Sociology	Participants were sociology students
		Other	Participants were students of other disciplines than economics, psychology, or sociology
Academic grade	Participants were grouped in different year groups (Values adopted from US educational system).	[int]	Participants' academic grade
Academic grade level	Participants were grouped in different categories based on their academic grade. Each study can use its own criterion to make this classification.	Junior	Participants were classified as junior with respect to their academic grade
		Middle	Participants were classified as middle with respect to their academic grade
		Senior	Participants were classified as senior with respect to their academic grade

Concept	Concept Definition	Values	Values Definition
Academic performance	Any indicator of how academic/school achievements (such as marks, grades, gpa, years of education). Achievement indicators can differ across countries and educational systems.	[bool]	
Knowledge of experimental games	Whether participants report to have experience with economic games and/or game theory. TRUE = Participants report to have experience with economic games and/or game theory, FALSE = Participants report not to have experience with economic games and/or game theory.	[bool]	
Knowledge of experimental games (correlation)	Correlation between reported experience with economic games and/or game theory and cooperation.	[bool]	
Emotions			
Emotion	Emotions are discrete, automatic responses to universally shared, culture-specific and individual-specific events (Ekman & Cordaro, 2011).	Neutral	Often used as a baseline in studies that elicit emotions. Participants are exposed either to stimuli with neutral emotional valence or engage in a non-emotional control task
		Anger	The response to interference with pursuit of a goal the participant cares about (Ekman & Cordaro, 2011)
		Fear	The response to the threat of harm (physical or psychological; Ekman & Cordaro, 2011)
		Surprise	The response to a sudden unexpected event (Ekman & Cordaro, 2011)
		Sadness	The response to the loss of an object or person to which a person is very attached (Ekman & Cordaro, 2011)
		Disgust	The repulsion by the sight, smell, or taste of something; disgust may also be provoked by people whose actions are revolting or by ideas that are offensive (Ekman & Cordaro, 2011)

Concept	Concept Definition	Values	Values Definition
		Contempt	Feeling morally superior to another person (Ekman & Cordaro, 2011)
		Happiness	Feelings that are enjoyed, that are sought by the person (Ekman & Cordaro, 2011)
		Guilt	The response when a person regrets having violated an agreement, principle, or value (Ekman & Cordaro, 2011)
		Shame	The response when a person feels that if their true nature was to be known, others would be repulsed (Ekman & Cordaro, 2011)
		Embarrassment	The response when people feel they have broken a social rule, and also when a person has been praised (Ekman & Cordaro, 2011)
		Envy	The response to another person's rewards which the envious person wishes to have (Ekman & Cordaro, 2011).
		Empathy	"Other-centered" emotion, which can result from observing another individual in need and imagining the person's situation (Batson, 1991)
		Gratitude	Pleasant feelings toward a target about the benefits received
		Self-consciousness	Emotion(s) that involve self-reflection and self-evaluation (e.g., guilt, shame, pride, embarrassment; Tagney, 1999)
		Regret	Emotion elicited by a comparison between the outcome of a choice (reality) and the better outcome of foregone rejected alternatives (what might have been) (Coricelli et al. 2007)
		Disappointment	A response to unfulfilled positive expectations (Van Dijk et al., 1999)
		Other emotion	None of the emotion categories apply

Concept	Concept Definition	Values	Values Definition
Emotion manipulation	Whether emotions of participants were elicited experimentally or measured through some instruments (e.g., questionnaires). TRUE = Participant's emotions were experimentally manipulated, FALSE = Participant's emotions were measured	[bool]	-
Emotion valence	Emotional valence is one of two axes (or dimensions) on which an emotion can be located. Value associated with a stimulus as expressed on a continuum from pleasant and attractive (positive) to unpleasant and aversive (negative). Emotional valence is coded when the study explicitly referred to it, without referring to a specific emotion. For example, own smiling is coded as positive emotion.	Positive	The participant experiences an emotion considered as pleasant and attractive
		Negative	The participant experiences an emotion considered as unpleasant and unattractive
		Neutral	The participant experiences an emotional state that can not be classified as positive or negative
Partner's emotion display	Mode by which a participant's partner can convey a certain emotional state.	Facial	Participants learn about partner's emotions via facial expressions
		Vocal	Participants learn about the partner's emotions via vocal cues (e.g., tone of voice)
		Posture	Participants learn about the partner's emotions via body position
		Other	None of the emotion display categories apply
Emotion intensity	Magnitude or strength of the experienced or expressed emotion.	Low	Low strength of the experience emotion
		Medium	Middle strength of the experience emotion
		High	High strength of the experience emotion

Concept	Concept Definition	Values	Values Definition
Partner's emotion	Emotion of the participant's partner in the social interaction (as it is reported in the paper). Emotions are discrete, automatic responses to universally shared, culture-specific and individual-specific events (Ekman & Cordaro, 2011).	Neutral	Often used as a baseline in studies that elicit emotions. Participants are exposed either to stimuli with neutral emotional valence or engage in a non-emotional control task
		Anger	The response to interference with our pursuit of a goal an agent cares about (Ekman & Cordaro, 2011)
		Fear	The response to the threat of harm, physical or psychological (Ekman & Cordaro, 2011)
		Surprise	The response to a sudden unexpected event (Ekman & Cordaro, 2011)
		Sadness	The response to the loss of an object or person to which you are very attached (Ekman & Cordaro, 2011)
		Disgust	The repulsion by the sight, smell, or taste of something; disgust may also be provoked by people whose actions are revolting or by ideas that are offensive (Ekman & Cordaro, 2011)
		Contempt	Feeling morally superior to another person (Ekman & Cordaro, 2011)
		Happiness	Feelings that are enjoyed, that are sought by the person (Ekman & Cordaro, 2011)
		Guilt	The response when a person regrets having violated an agreement, principle, or value (Ekman & Cordaro, 2011)
		Shame	The response when a person feels that if their true nature was to be known, others would be repulsed (Ekman & Cordaro, 2011)
		Embarrassment	The response when people feel they have broken a social rule, and also when a person has been praised (Ekman & Cordaro, 2011)

Concept	Concept Definition	Values	Values Definition
		Envy	The response to another person's rewards which the envious person wishes to have (Ekman & Cordaro, 2011)
		Empathy	"Other-centered" emotion, which can result from observing another individual in need and imagining the person's situation (Batson, 1991)
		Gratitude	Pleasant feelings toward a target about the benefits received
		Self-consciousness	Emotion(s) that involve self-reflection and self-evaluation (e.g., guilt, shame, pride, embarrassment; Tagney, 1999)
		Regret	Emotion elicited by a comparison between the outcome of a choice (reality) and the better outcome of foregone rejected alternatives (what might have been) (Coricelli et al. 2007)
		Disappointment	Emotion experienced in response to unfulfilled positive expectations (Van Dijk et al., 1999)
		Other emotion	None of the emotion categories apply

Concept	Concept Definition	Values	Values Definition
Partner's emotion manipulation	Whether emotions of the partner were elicited experimentally or measured through some instruments (e.g., questionnaires). TRUE = Partner's emotions were experimentally manipulated, FALSE = Partner's emotions were measures	[bool]	-
Partner's emotion valence	Emotional valence is one of two axes (or dimensions) on which an emotion can be located. Value associated with a stimulus as expressed on a continuum from pleasant and attractive (positive) to unpleasant and aversive (negative). Emotional valence is coded when the study explicitly referred to the valence of the emotion displayed by the partner, without referring to the specific emotion.	Positive	The partner experiences or displays an emotion considered as pleasant and attractive
		Neutral	The partner experiences or displays an emotion considered as unpleasant and unattractive
		Negative	The partner experiences or displays an emotional state that can not classified as positive or negative
Ethnicity			
Ethnicity (US)	Participant's ethnic group (values adopted from US Census).	White	Europe, Middle East, North Africa
		Black or African American	Africa
		American Indian or Alaska Native	North America, South America, Central America
		Asian	Far East, Southeast Asia, Indian
		Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander	Hawaii, Guam, Samoa, Pacific Islands
		Other	Participant's ethnic group does not fall under the defined categories

Concept	Concept Definition	Values	Values Definition
*Nationality or region	Participant's nationality according to ISO-3 Country Code.	[string]	-
Small-scale society	Participant's small-scale society of origin, according to the d-place classification. A society can be understood to represent a group of people at a focal location with a shared language that differs from that of their neighbors" (Kirby et al., 2016).	[string]	-
		Other	Other small-scale society not included in the d-society classification
Heterogeneous ethnicity	Whether groups had a mixed ethnic composition (also applies to mixed nationalities and small-scale societies). TRUE = Groups had a mixed ethnic composition (also applies to mixed nationalities and small-scale societies), FALSE = Groups had a homogeneous ethnic composition (also applies to nationalities and small-scale societies).	[bool]	-
Expectations			
Expectations	Correlation between cooperation and participants' expectations are stated beliefs about their partner's behavior, such as whether they will cooperate or defect, the probability that they will defect, or the expected size of their contribution to a public good.	[bool]	-
Expectations level	Participant expectations have been manipulated in the study, or authors split the sample in some way based on stated expectations of partner cooperation.	Low	Participants have low expectations about the other player(s)' behavior in the game
		Medium	Participants have medium expectations about the other player(s)' behavior in the game
		High	Participants have medium expectations about the other player(s)' behavior in the game

Concept	Concept Definition	Values	Values Definition
Experimental Setting			
*Experimental setting	The setting in which the experiment was conducted.	Online	The experiment was conducted online on a web platform (e.g., MTurk)
		Lab	The experiment was conducted in a laboratory (Classrooms used as laboratory setting are considered as lab)
		Classroom	The experiment was conducted during a regular class (e.g., during some demonstration of a negotiation task for teaching purposes)
		Field	The experiment involved a manipulation carried out in the field (Subjects may or may not be aware that they are part of an experiment)
		Lab in the field	The experiment had all the characteristics of a lab experiment but it is carried out at a field site
		Natural experiment	A quasi-experiment in the field in which randomization is not controlled by the experimenter (e.g., a study using a TV game show)

Concept	Concept Definition	Values	Values Definition
Extra Annotation			
Other coding	Broad classification of specific variables and treatments can not be captured by any of the variables annotated in the ontology.	Individual Differences	Individual differences include any variable that was measured at the individual level and on which individuals vary (e.g., personality traits, beliefs, attitudes, values, preferences, emotions, behavior, mood, socio-economic background, gender, age, and education)
		Task Structure	Task structure includes any variable that affects how the social dilemma game is implemented and how the structure of the situation varies. This group of variables includes the variables labeled as "Study Characteristics" in the Ontology and in the Interface, such as: game type, conflict indices, payoff structure, MPCR, returns from the public good, provision points, experimental setting, game duration, sequentiality, choice options, matching protocols, group size, network structure, incentives, feedback, procedure, power, order effects, and manipulations of uncertainty and heterogeneity of any of the above mentioned variables.
		Institutions	Institutions includes any variable that is about rules that regulate how people interact in the dilemma. This group of variables includes the implementation of communication, punishment, reward, taxations, auctions, and voting

Concept	Concept Definition	Values	Values Definition
		Interactions in the Game	Interactions in the Game includes variables that relate to the relationships between individuals interacting in the social dilemmas or the perceptions of the partner(s) based on impressions or on their behavior in the game. This group of variables includes partner strategy, anonymity, closeness, similarity, acquaintance, reputational information, content of communication, credibility of promises, information about the partner(s), eye contact, partner's goal, and group identification
		Country	Country coding includes variables measured at the country/city/ethnic group level that are correlated with cooperative behavior in the social dilemma. This group of variables is only composed by country/city/ethnic group level indicators and, thus, this variable does not vary for participants from the same country country/city/ethnic group
		Other	Other coding includes any other variables that cannot be classified using any of the above-mentioned categories. Example of these variables are: game framing, priming, fmri scanner, singing, University affiliation, classifications of participants based on social categorization (e.g., job), Language of the experiment, performance in other unrelated tasks, default options, others' behavior and outcomes, response to strategy method

Concept	Concept Definition	Values	Values Definition
Feedback			
Feedback target	What type of information participants received about their partner(s) decisions and/or outcomes after each trial of the game (Note that Individual feedback entails Group feedback).	Absent	No feedback is provided
		Individual	Feedback about each group member's behavior is provided
		Group	Feedback about the group's aggregate behavior (e.g., mean contribution, sum of contributions)
		Leader	Exclusively feedback about the leader's behavior, if a leader is present in the game
		Network	Feedback about the aggregate behavior of all individuals belonging to the same network, if networks are present in the game
		Other	Feedback about behavior of other specific participants in the game that do not fall under any of the Feedback target categories (e.g., only feedback from a few individuals is provided)
Feedback content	What type of feedback information participants receive after each trial of the game (Note that earnings feedback might entails other feedback contents, such as feedback about rank).	Choice	Feedback about contributions, withdrawals, or binary decisions
		Earnings	Feedback about earnings (included ranks based on earnings and performance)
		Failure	Feedback about the failure of the group in reaching some payoff-relevant threshold in the game
		Success	Feedback about the success of the group in reaching some payoff-relevant threshold in the game

Concept	Concept Definition	Values	Values Definition
		Rank	Feedback about the rank of participants in terms of their behavior (e.g., from the most cooperative to the least cooperative)
		Others	Feedback about other payoff-relevant information not mentioned in any of the Feedback content categories
Framing			
Gain-Loss frame	Gain vs. loss framing is a form of valence framing (Levin, Schneider, & Gaeth, 1998; Gerlach, Jaeger, & Hertwig, 2018). Specifically, outcomes of the decision are either in the domain of gains (i.e., positively-valued) or in the domain of losses (i.e., negatively valued).	Gain	The game is framed in terms of gains, i.e., outcomes of decisions are positively-valued.
		Loss	The game is framed in terms of losses, i.e., outcomes of decisions are negatively-valued. This includes games in which only some outcomes are negatively valued.
Give-Take frame	Give-some vs. take-some games are a form of valence framing involving changes in the suggested property rights. For instance, common pool games can be described as decisions on how much to "give" to a public good (public goods games) or how much to "take" from a collectively shared resource (commons dilemmas) (Gerlach, Jaeger, & Hertwig, 2018).	Give-some	The game is framed as a give-some dilemma, i.e., endowments are allocated to the player and can be contributed to the public good.
		Take-some	The game is framed as a take-some dilemma, i.e., endowment is allocated to the public good (or common resource) and can be extracted by the player.

Concept	Concept Definition	Values	Values Definition
Public Good-Bad frame	Public goods vs. public bads refer to the framing of the consequence of decisions for others. In public goods provision, contributions to the public good are described to provide a benefit to others. In public bad-type games, contributions to the public bad impose a cost on others, or contributions to the private good impose a negative externality on others.	Public Good	The game is framed in terms of positive outcomes to others arising from contributions to the public good.
		Public Bad	The game is framed in terms of negative outcomes to others arising from contributions to the public bad or in terms of negative externalities from contributions to the private good.
Focal point frame	In coordination games, frames can used techniques to refer participants to a unique but principally arbitrary move by highlighting one particular choice (e.g., by bolding the text in one cell). TRUE = Has a focal point frame, FALSE = Has no focal point frame.	[bool]	-
Context frame	Context framing involves differently worded, but logically equivalent, descriptions of otherwise unchanged games (Gerlach, Jaeger, & Hertwig, 2018).	Generic	Generic frames refer to concepts other than moral, competitive, or cooperative
		Moral	Moral frames refer to how one ought to behave, for example, in terms of fairness, religious appeals, and responsibility for each other's payoffs
		Competitive	Competitive frames refer to discord and rivalry among the participants
		Cooperative	Cooperative frames refer to the participants' common interests

Concept	Concept Definition	Values	Values Definition
Game Comprehension			
Comprehension of the game	Correlation between cooperation and the degree to which participants understood the game (Usually based on answers to comprehension questions).	[bool]	-
Comprehension of the game level	Participants are classified according to their relative level of comprehension of the game.	Low	Participants had a low level of comprehension of the game
		Medium	Participants had a medium level of comprehension of the game
		High	Participants had a high level of comprehension of the game
Game Duration			
*Number of trials	The number of trials (rounds) in each block.	[int]	-
Number of trials level	Relative level of the number of trials (rounds) in each block.	Low	Low relative level of the number of trials (rounds) in each block
		Medium	Medium relative level of the number of trials (rounds) in each block
		High	High relative level of the number of trials (rounds) in each block

Concept	Concept Definition	Values	Values Definition
Number of blocks	The total number of blocks across the full experimental session. A block is a unit within the experiment in which trials have the same treatment and matching procedure. E.g., ten trials of partner-matched play followed by ten trials of partner-matched play with a different partner are two blocks of ten trials (because re-matching takes place). Ten trials of stranger-matched play followed by ten more trials of stranger-matched play are one block of 20 trials. Ten trials of stranger-matched play as baseline followed by ten more trials of stranger-matched play with punishment are two blocks of ten trials, as the treatment changes. Thus, divisions of trials into blocks only for analysis are not treated as blocks.	[int]	-
Number of blocks level	Relative level of the total number of blocks across the full experimental session.	Low	Low relative level of the total number of blocks across the full experimental session
		Medium	Medium relative level of the total number of blocks across the full experimental session
		High	High relative level of the total number of blocks across the full experimental session
Number of sessions	The number of full experimental sessions. Each session involves multiple blocks (i.e., iterated games of varying, but predetermined length).	[int]	-
*One-shot vs repeated	Whether participants played the game with the same person only once (this also applies if participants switch partners after each trial) versus played the game repeatedly with the same person.	One-shot	One-shot
		Repeated	Repeated

Concept	Concept Definition	Values	Values Definition
*Known endgame	Whether participants know the exact number of trials at the beginning of the experiment. Endgame is considered known also when participants played a one-shot game. TRUE = Known endgame, FALSE = Endgame not known.	[bool]	-
Continuation probability	In some games, there is no pre-specified number of trials; rather there is a prespecified probability that the block or session ends at each trial. This probability may only kick in after a prespecified number of trials (e.g., minimum of 10 trials, then the game ends with p = 0.5).	[double]	-
Continuation probability level	Relative gain of the prespecified probability that the block or session ends at each trial.	Low	Low relative gain of the prespecified probability that the block or session ends at each trial
		Medium	Medium relative gain of the prespecified probability that the block or session ends at each trial
		High	High relative gain of the prespecified probability that the block or session ends at each trial
Game Type			
*Game type	Game that participants play during the experimental session. Code it when participants' behavior is compared across multiple games.	Prisoner's Dilemma Game	In the standard prisoner's dilemma game, the relative value of the four outcomes reflects the following relationships: DC > CC > DD > CD
		Continuous Public Goods Game	In the continuous public goods game, subjects are provided an endowment and decide any portion to allocate to the public good, and the remaining about is kept for themselves. The group contributions in the public pool are multiplied by a factor (greater than one and less than the number of players, N) and it is divided among players, regardless of the players contributions

Concept	Concept Definition	Values	Values Definition
		Step-level Public Goods Game	In the step level public goods game, subjects are provided an endowment and decide any portion of the endowment to allocate to the public good, and the remaining amount is kept for themselves. The group contributions to the public pool are multiplied by a factor and it is divided among players (regardless of their contributions) only if a certain threshold (provision point) is met
		Resource Dilemma	In the standard resource dilemma game, players harvest resources from a common resource pool of known size, and after each trial the pool is replenished at a predetermined rate and is exhausted when the withdrawals exceed the resource in the pool
		Intergroup Public Goods Game	In the intergroup public goods game, different groups of players play together with a PGD structure. However, payoff to a player is an increasing (or at least nondecreasing) function of the total contribution made by members of his or her own group and a decreasing (or at least nonincreasing) function of the total contribution made by members of the opposing group.
		Intergroup Prisoner's Dilemma	In the intergroup prisoner's dilemma game, different groups of players play together with a PDG structure. However, payoff to a player is an increasing (or at least nondecreasing) function of the total contribution made by members of his or her own group and a decreasing (or at least nonincreasing) function of the total contribution made by members of the opposing group

Concept	Concept Definition	Values	Values Definition
		Intergroup Prisoner's Dilemma-Maximizing Differences	The game is played by two groups. Each player receives an endowment and can contribute any portion to the group's fund. For each token contributed by a member of the in-group, each of its members, including the contributor, gains a specific amount and each member of the out-group loses a specified amount. The tokens kept for oneself are doubled.
		Trust Game - sender	In the standard trust game, players are provided an endowment, paired, and assigned to either the role of sender or receiver. At stage one of the game, the sender may either pass nothing, or any portion of the endowment to the receiver. The sender then keeps the remaining endowment for themselves. The experimenter then triples the amount sent to the receiver. In stage two, the receiver may either pass nothing, or pass any portion of the money received back to the sender
		Trust Game - receiver	In the standard trust game, players are provided an endowment, paired, and assigned to either the role of sender or receiver. At stage one of the game, the sender may either pass nothing, or any portion of the endowment to the receiver. The sender then keeps the remaining endowment for themselves. The experimenter then triples the amount sent to the receiver. In stage two, the receiver may either pass nothing, or pass any portion of the money received back to the sender.
		Stag Hunt	In the standard stag hunt, the relative value of the four outcomes reflects the following relationships: CC > DC ≥ DD > CD

Concept	Concept Definition	Values	Values Definition
		Chicken Game	In the standard chicken game, the relative value of the four outcomes reflects the following relationships: DC > CC > CD > DD
		Dictator Game	In standard dictator game, participants are assigned to either the role of dictator or recipient. The dictator is given a fixed amount of money and is entitled to decide how much money to keep and how much money to give to the recipient
		Ultimatum game - Proposer	In standard ultimatum game, the first player proposes how to divide a sum of money with the second party. If the second player rejects this division, neither gets anything. If the second player accepts, the first gets her demand and the second gets the rest
		Ultimatum game - Responder	In standard ultimatum game, the first player proposes how to divide a sum of money with the second party. If the second player rejects this division, neither gets anything. If the second player accepts, the first gets her demand and the second gets the rest
		Other Game	None of the Game type categories apply

Concept	Concept Definition	Values	Values Definition
*Other game type	If none of the Game type categories apply, then we report the name of the game included in the study.	[string]	
Behavior in different game	Correlation between behavior in the current game (i.e., The game coded under "game type" in study characteristics) and behavior in other games.	Prisoner's Dilemma Game	In the standard prisoner's dilemma game, the relative value of the four outcomes reflects the following relationships: DC > CC > DD > CD
		Continuous Public Goods Game	In the continuous public goods game, subjects are provided an endowment and decide any portion to allocate to the public good, and the remaining about is kept for themselves. The group contributions in the public pool are multiplied by a factor (greater than one and less than the number of players, N) and it is divided among players, regardless of the players contributions
		Step-level Public Goods Game	In the step level public goods game, subjects are provided an endowment and decide any portion of the endowment to allocate to the public good, and the remaining amount is kept for themselves. The group contributions to the public pool are multiplied by a factor and it is divided among players (regardless of their contributions) only if a certain threshold (provision point) is met
		Resource Dilemma	In the standard resource dilemma game, players harvest resources from a common resource pool of known size, and after each trial the pool is replenished at a predetermined rate and is exhausted when the withdrawals exceed the resource in the pool

Concept	Concept Definition	Values	Values Definition
		Intergroup Public Goods Game	In the intergroup public goods game, different groups of players play together with a PGD structure. However, payoff to a player is an increasing (or at least nondecreasing) function of the total contribution made by members of his or her own group and a decreasing (or at least nonincreasing) function of the total contribution made by members of the opposing group
		Intergroup Prisoner's Dilemma	In the intergroup prisoner's dilemma game, different groups of players play together with a PDG structure. However, payoff to a player is an increasing (or at least nondecreasing) function of the total contribution made by members of his or her own group and a decreasing (or at least nonincreasing) function of the total contribution made by members of the opposing group.
		Intergroup Prisoner's Dilemma-Maximizing Differences	The game is played by two groups. Each player receives an endowment and can contribute any portion to the group's fund. For each token contributed by a member of the in-group, each of its members, including the contributor, gains a specific amount and each member of the out-group loses a specified amount. The tokens kept for oneself are doubled.
		Trust Game - sender	In the standard trust game, players are provided an endowment, paired, and assigned to either the role of sender or receiver. At stage one of the game, the sender may either pass nothing, or any portion of the endowment to the receiver. The sender then keeps the remaining endowment for themselves. The experimenter then triples the amount sent to the receiver. In stage two, the receiver may either pass nothing, or pass any portion of the money received back to the sender.

Concept	Concept Definition	Values	Values Definition
		Trust Game - receiver	In the standard trust game, players are provided an endowment, paired, and assigned to either the role of sender or receiver. At stage one of the game, the sender may either pass nothing, or any portion of the endowment to the receiver. The sender then keeps the remaining endowment for themselves. The experimenter then triples the amount sent to the receiver. In stage two, the receiver may either pass nothing, or pass any portion of the money received back to the sender.
		Stag Hunt	In the standard stag hunt, the relative value of the four outcomes reflects the following relationships: CC > DC ≥ DD > CD
		Chicken Game	In the standard chicken game, the relative value of the four outcomes reflects the following relationships: DC > CC > CD > DD
		Dictator Game	In standard dictator game, participants are assigned to either the role of dictator or recipient. The dictator is given a fixed amount of money and is entitled to decide how much money to keep and how much money to give to the recipient.
		Ultimatum game - Proposer	In standard ultimatum game, the first player proposes how to divide a sum of money with the second party. If the second player rejects this division, neither gets anything. If the second player accepts, the first gets her demand and the second gets the rest
		Ultimatum game - Responder	In standard ultimatum game, the first player proposes how to divide a sum of money with the second party. If the second player rejects this division, neither gets anything. If the second player accepts, the first gets her demand and the second gets the rest

Concept	Concept Definition	Values	Values Definition
		Other Game	None of the Game type categories apply
Behavior in different other game		[string]	N/A
Gender			
Gender	Participant's gender as reported in the paper. Positive correlations effect size always mean that men cooperated more than women.	Male	Male
		Female	Female
Heterogeneous gender	Whether groups had a mixed gender composition (both males and women). TRUE = Groups had a mixed gender composition (both males and women), FALSE = Groups had a homogeneous gender composition (only males or only women).	[bool]	-
Partner's gender is known	Whether participants were aware of the gender of their partner(s). TRUE = Participants were aware of the gender of their partner(s), FALSE = Participants were not aware of the gender of their partner(s).	[bool]	-
Gender Role			
Gender role	Gender role refers to the culturally and socially constructed meanings that describe how women and men should behave in certain situations according to feminine and masculine roles learned throughout life (Alabas et al., 2012).	Career oriented	High scoring individuals give a greater importance to the career as compared to more traditional activities (e.g., the care of the family)
		Tradition oriented	High scoring individuals on this dimension give a greater importance to more traditional activities (e.g., the care of the family) as compared to the career

Concept	Concept Definition	Values	Values Definition
Group Size			
*Group size	Overall number of people affected by the choices in the game.	[int]	-
Group size level	Relative size of the group, in case exact group size is not provided or it is not relevant (e.g., different group sizes are collapsed together and compared with others).	Small	Small relative size of the group
		Medium	Medium relative size of the group
		Large	Large relative size of the group
Decision maker	Participant(s) accountable for making a decision in the game. Mostly manipulated in studies examining interindividual-intergroup discontinuity.	Individual	The decision maker is a single individual. Individuals make a single decision, to be then matched with others in the game, producing an outcome for all participants involved (e.g., each person making a decision in a 4-persons PGD)
		Group	The decision maker is a group of participants. Each decision maker group makes a single decision, to be then matched with other decisions in the game and produce an outcome for all decision makers involved (e.g., two groups of three participants make two decisions to be matched in a PDG)

Concept	Concept Definition	Values	Values Definition
Number of decision makers	Number of decision makers that each produce unique decisions that are used to calculate the collective payoff (e.g., 4 decision makers in a standard 4-persons PGD; 2 decision makers in a PDG with a 4-person group involving two subgroups that produce one decision each).	[int]	-
Size of unit of decision maker	Number of participants constituting a single decision maker unit (e.g., if a 6-person public good is divided into 2 triads that each make decisions, then the decision maker unit size is 3; in a 6-person public good where each person makes their own decision, then the individual decision maker unit is 1).	[int]	-
Group size (correlation)	Correlation between Group Size and behavior in the game.	[bool]	-
Group size multilevel ratio	Games can be multilevel in which contribution decisions do not involve a single group, but two or more groups of different sizes and participants can make decisions to contribute to local and global accounts (e.g., Buchan et al., 2011). It is calculated as number of participants in the smallest unit divided by number of total participants in the broader collective.	[double]	-
Hormones			
Hormones administration	Participants were administered hormones prior to the decision in the game (e.g., via intranasal administration).	Oxytocin	Oxytocin hormone
		Vasopressin	Vasopressin hormone
		Placebo	Participants were administered a placebo
Hormone	Participants were tested for the presence of a specific hormone.	Testosterone	Testosterone hormone
		Cortisol	Cortisol hormone

Concept	Concept Definition	Values	Values Definition
Hormone level	Participants were classified according to their level of a specific hormone.	Low	Participants displayed low levels of a specific hormone
		Medium	Participants displayed medium levels of a specific hormone
		High	Participants displayed high levels of a specific hormone
Identification			
Partner's group membership	Whether the participant is interacting with a partner identified as ingroup, outgroup, or stranger.	Ingroup	Partner(s) is a member of the participant's group
		Outgroup	Partner(s) is a member of a different group than the participant
		Stranger	Participants are not informed about whether their partner is an ingroup or outgroup member
		Ingroup and Outgroup	When an experimental treatment explicitly provides information that a partner or group belongs to both an ingroup and an outgroup
Identification	Correlation between extent to which the participants identify with their partner(s) and cooperation.	[bool]	-
Identification level	Extent to which the participants identify with their partner(s).	Low	Participant's identification with their partner is low
		Medium	Participant's identification with their partner is medium
		High	Participant's identification with their partner is high
Group type	Whether the group the participant is interacting with is a naturally occurring group or experimentally induced group (e.g., minimal group paradigm).	Natural group	A naturally occurring group (e.g., political partisans, nationalities)
		Experimentally induced group	An experimentally induced group (e.g., minimal group paradigm)

Concept	Concept Definition	Values	Values Definition
Knowledge of group membership	Who has knowledge of the focal and target agents' group membership.	Unknown	Neither the participant or their partner know each others' group membership
		Unilateral	The participant knows their partner's group membership, but not vice-versa
		Common	The participant and their partner know each others' group membership
Entitativity	Correlation between cooperation and self-reported perception that the group is an entity (e.g., similarity and interdependence)(Gaertner & Schopler, 1998).	[bool]	-
Entitativity level	The relative level of entitativity (i.e., the perception that the group is an entity) between participants.	Low	Participants were classified as having low levels of entitativity
		Medium	Participants were classified as having medium levels of entitativity
		High	Participants were classified as having high levels of entitativity
Incentives			
*Game incentive	Whether participants' decisions in the game determine their payoffs in different forms.	Hypothetical	Decisions in the game resulted in outcomes with hypothetical value for participants (e.g., points)
		Monetary	Decisions in the game resulted in monetary outcomes, often converted from game points
		Non-monetary Material	Decisions in the game resulted in outcomes involving some amount of other (non-monetary) material resource (e.g., candies, school supplies)
		Non-monetary Social	Decisions in the game resulted players receiving social incentives, such as blame or praise, from others based on the outcome of the game

Concept	Concept Definition	Values	Values Definition
*Lottery incentive	Whether the study involved a lottery to get paid (monetary or non-monetary) resources based on the outcome of the game. TRUE = A lottery was implemented as incentive, FALSE = A lottery was not implemented as incentive.	[bool]	-
*Show-up fee	Whether participants received a show-up fee for the study (i.e., a certain payment for participation). TRUE = Show-up fee, FALSE = No show-up fee.	[bool]	-
Individual differences			
Individual difference	Personality traits are probabilistic descriptions of relatively stable patterns of emotion, motivation, cognition, and behavior, in response to classes of stimuli" (DeYoung, 2015, p. 35).	Agreeableness (FFM)	[Individual] differences in the motivation to cooperate (vs. acting selfishly) in resource conflicts (Denissen & Penke, 2008, p. 1285)
		Agreeableness (HEXACO)	The tendency to be forgiving and tolerant of others, in the sense of cooperating with others even when one might be suffering exploitation by them (Ashton & Lee, 2007, p. 156)
		Conscientiousness	The proactive side of Conscientiousness is seen most clearly in the need for achievement and commitment to work; the inhibitive side is seen in moral scrupulousness and cautiousness (Costa et al., 1991, p. 889)
		Emotionality	Tendencies relevant to the construct of kin altruism [...], including not only empathic concern and emotional attachment toward close others (who tend to be one's kin) but also the harm-avoidant and help-seeking behaviors that are associated with investment in kin (Ashton & Lee, 2007, p. 156)

Concept	Concept Definition	Values	Values Definition
		Extraversion	[Individual differences in] engagement in social endeavors (such as socializing, leading, or entertaining) (Ashton & Lee, 2007, p. 156)
		Honesty-humility	The tendency to be fair and genuine in dealing with others, in the sense of cooperating with others even when one might exploit them without suffering retaliation (Ashton & Lee, 2007, p. 156)
		Neuroticism	A broad domain of negative affect, including predispositions to experience anxiety, anger, depression, shame, and other distressing emotions (Costa, Terracciano, & McCrae, 2001, p. 322)
		Openness to experience	[Individual differences in] engagement in idea-related endeavors (such as learning, imagining, and thinking) (Ashton & Lee, 2007, p. 156)
		Social value orientation	Dispositional weights individuals assign to their own and to others' outcomes in interdependent situations (Kuhlman, Camac, & Cunha, 1986; McClintock, 1972)
		Altruism	A disposition that leads people who have more of it to be more compassionate and caring toward others in distress (Batson, Bolen, Cross, & Neuringer-Benefiel, 1986, p. 212)
		Concern for others	Individual differences in the extent to which […] other people's interests serve as guides for behavior (Gerbasi & Prentice, 2013, p. 495)
		Empathy	Reactions of one individual to the observed experiences of others (Davis, 1983, p. 113)

Concept	Concept Definition	Values	Values Definition
		Inequality aversion	[Individual differences in] perceptions of and reactions to observed […] or committed injustice (Schmitt, Baumert, Gollwitzer, & Maes, 2010, p. 212); an individual is inequity averse if he dislikes outcomes that are perceived as inequitable (Fehr & Schmidt, 1999, p. 820).
		Pro-environmentalism	The collection of beliefs, affect, and behavioral intentions a person holds regarding environmentally related activities or issues (Schultz, Shriver, Tabanico, & Khazian, 2004, p. 31)
		Forgiveness	Disposition to forgive interpersonal transgressions over time and across situations (Berry, Worthington, O'Connor, Parrott, & Wade, 2005, p. 183)
		Positive reciprocity	Positive reactions to positively valued behaviours with the emphasis on rewarding someone else's behaviour (Perugini, Gallucci, Presaghi, & Ercolani, 2003, p. 274)
		Aggression	Trait aggressiveness […] identifies people who are prone to hostile cognitions and angry affect as well as a readiness to engage in physical and verbal aggression (Bettencourt, Talley, Benjamin, & Valentine, 2006, p. 752)
		Competitiveness	Individuals' desire to do better than others, their desire to win in interpersonal situations, and their enjoyment of interpersonal competition (Houston, McIntire, Kinnie, & Terry, 2002, p. 286)
		Envy	[Tendency to experience a] sense of inferiority […and] ill will, frustration, and a subjective sense of injustice prompted by unflattering comparison (Smith, Parrott, Diener, Hoyle, & Kim, 1999, p. 1010). For coding: Justice sensitivity (victim perspective subscale has to be coded as envy)

Concept	Concept Definition	Values	Values Definition
		Greed	An insatiable desire for more resources, monetary or other (Krekels & Pandelaere, 2015, p. 225)
		Machiavellianism	A duplicitous interpersonal style, characterized by a cynical disregard for morality and a focus on self-interest and personal gain (Muris et al., 2017, p. 184)
		Narcissism	A grandiose view of the self, a strong sense of entitlement and superiority, a lack of empathy, and a need for social admiration, as well as tendencies to show dominant, charming, bragging, impulsive, and aggressive behaviors (Back et al., 2013, p. 1014)
		Psychopathy	A personality trait characterized by enduring antisocial behavior, diminished empathy and remorse, and disinhibited or bold behavior (Muris et al., 2017, p. 184)
		Sadism	The term sadistic personality describes a person who humiliates others, shows a longstanding pattern of cruel or demeaning behavior to others, or intentionally inflicts physical, sexual, or psychological pain or suffering on others in order to assert power and dominance or for pleasure and enjoyment (O'Meara, Davies, & Hammond, 2011, p. 523)
		Belief in a just world	[Individuals' tendency] to believe that they live in a world where people generally get what they deserve (Lerner & Miller, 1978, p. 1030)
		Trust propensity	A person's general willingness to trust others (Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman, 1995, p. 714) [based on] expectation of partner's goodwill and benign intent (Yamagishi & Yamagishi, 1994, p. 131)
		Guilt proneness	Predisposition to experience negative feelings about personal wrongdoing, even when the wrongdoing is private (T. R. Cohen, Panter, & Turan, 2012, p. 355)

Concept	Concept Definition	Values	Values Definition
		Integrity	Integrity involves honesty, trustworthiness, fidelity in keeping one's word and obligations, and incorruptibility, or an unwillingness to violate principles regardless of the temptations, costs, and preferences of others (Schlenker, 2008, p. 1081)
		Collectivism	One's tendency to give priority to the collective self over the private self, especially when these two come into conflict (Yamagishi, Kuhlman, & Sugimori, 1995, p. 659)
		Individualism	Individualists will see themselves as more differentiated and separate from others, and place more importance on asserting their individuality (Bochner, 1994, p. 274)
		Power	Desire for power and a drive to come out on top in a status hierarchy (Grina, Bergh, Akrami, & Sidanius, 2016, p. 114)
		Right-wing authoritatianism	Opposing any change in the social status quo, […] favouring tough punishment of deviance, nonconformity, or innovation, [and] favouring traditional, old-fashioned lifestyles, behavioural norms, and values (Duckitt, Bizumic, Krauss, & Heled, 2010, p. 691)
		Social dominance orientation	Individual differences in the preference for group based hierarchy and inequality (Ho et al., 2015, p. 1003)
		Self-control	The ability to override or change one's inner responses, as well as to interrupt undesired behavioral tendencies (such as impulses) and refrain from acting on them (Tangney, Baumeister, & Boone, 2004, p. 274)

Concept	Concept Definition	Values	Values Definition
		Self-presentation	The extent to which individuals can and do monitor their self-presentation, expressive behavior, and non-verbal affective display (Snyder, 1974, pp. 526/527), [potentially motivated by] the identity concern of one's […] evaluation (De Cremer & Tyler, 2005, p. 121)
		Impulsivity	Tendency to deliberate less than most people of equal ability before taking action (Dickman, 1990, p. 95)
		Intuitive thinking style	Reliance on and enjoyment of feelings and intuitions in making decisions [and] a high level of ability with respect to one's intuitive impressions and feelings (Pacini & Epstein, 1999, p. 974)
		Reflective thinking style	Reliance on and enjoyment of thinking in an analytical, logical manner [and] a high level of ability to think logically and analytically (Pacini & Epstein, 1999, p. 974).
		Anxiety	The stable tendency to attend to, experience, and report negative emotions such as fears, worries, and anxiety across many situations (Gidron, 2013, p. 1989)
		Negative affect	Individual differences in the tendency to experience negative moods and feelings, including sadness, worry, and anger (Stanton & Watson, 2014, p. 556)
		Positive affect	Individual differences in the tendency to experience positive emotions and feeling states (Stanton & Watson, 2014, p. 556)
		Shame proneness	High shame-prone individuals attribute transgressions and negative outcomes to characterological faults, experiencing global feelings of self-debasement and enduring negative affect (Thompson, Altmann, & Davidson, 2004, p. 613)

Concept	Concept Definition	Values	Values Definition
		Achievement	Recurrent concern with a standard of excellence and the disposition to derive satisfaction from the mastery of challenging tasks (Schönbrodt & Gerstenberg, 2012, p. 726)
		Affiliation	[Desire] to establish and/or maintain warm and friendly interpersonal relations (French & Chadwick, 1956, p. 296)
		Approach	Proneness to engage in goal-directed efforts and to experience positive feelings when the person is exposed to cues of impending reward (Carver & White, 1994, p. 319)
		Avoidance	Sensitivity to the presence or absence of negative outcomes [and] vigilant avoidance of losses or failures (Lockwood, Jordan, & Kunda, 2002, p. 854)
		Emotional intelligence	Extent to which [individuals] attend to, process, and utilize affect-laden information of an intrapersonal (e.g., managing one's own emotions) or interpersonal (e.g., managing others' emotions) nature (Petrides & Furnham, 2006, p. 553)
		Locus of control	The degree to which persons expect that a reinforcement or an outcome of their behavior is contingent on their own behavior or personal characteristics versus the degree to which persons expect that the reinforcement or outcome is a function of chance, luck, or fate, is under the control of powerful others, or is simply unpredictable (Rotter, 1990, p. 489)
		Optimism	Generalized expectations of the occurrence of good outcomes in one's life (Scheier & Carver, 1985, p. 239)

Concept	Concept Definition	Values	Values Definition
		Self-esteem	Individual differences in the evaluation of one's self-worth and self-respect (Gnambs, Scharl, & Schroeders, 2018, p. 14)
		Risk-taking	One's general degree of comfort with facing uncertain gains or losses (Ehrlich & Maestas, 2010, p. 658)
		Social desirability	Tendency to provide answers that are considered socially acceptable in order to present themselves in a favorable light
		Cognitive ability	One's general mental capability involving reasoning, problem solving, planning, abstract thinking, complex idea comprehension, and learning from experience (Gottfredson, 1997)
		Life history strategy	Different allocation decisions to the various activities that comprise the life cycle between current and future reproduction, between quality and quantity of offspring, and—in sexual species—between mating and parenting effort (Del Giudice, 2014)
		Trust in self	Beliefs about the trust that others have in themselves
		SVO consistency	Consistency in the choice pattern with which SVO is measured
		Tolerance for ambiguity	Desire for 'an answer on a given topic, any answer […] compared to confusion and ambiguity (Kruglanski, 1990; p. 337)
		Victimization	Individuals who are a frequent target of aggressions
		Self-efficacy	People's beliefs in their ability to influence events that affect their lives (Bandura, 2010)
		Risk-taking (behavioral measure)	Risk-taking preferences are measured by participants making a choice between options that involve probabilisic outcomes.

Concept	Concept Definition	Values	Values Definition
Psychopathology	Participants were classified as having abnormal cognitions and behaviors.	Borderline	Diagnosed on the basis of a pervasive pattern of instability of interpersonal relationships, self-image, and affects, and marked impulsivity beginning by early adulthood and present in a variety of contexts (DSM-5)
		Bipolar	Group of brain disorders that cause extreme fluctuation in a person's mood, energy, and ability to function (DSM-5)
		Autism spectrum disorders	Deficits in social-emotional reciprocity, nonverbal communicative behaviors used for social interaction, and in developing, maintaining, and understanding relationships.
		Depression	Experience of persistent feelings of sadness and hopelessness and lose interest in activities they once enjoyed.
		Non-suicidal self-injury	Deliberate destruction of one's body in the absence of intent to die (e.g., cutting, burning, or hitting oneself)
		Suicide attempt	Individuals who attempted suicide
		Stress	Experience of being over-aroused, tense, unable to relax touchy, easily upset, irritable, easily startled nervy, jumpy, fidgety, intolerant of interruption or delay (Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995)
		Schizophrenia	Condition characterized by presence of hallucinations, delusions, and disordered thinking and behavior that impairs daily functioning, among other symptoms
		Control	Control group that does not present the disorder under investigation

Concept	Concept Definition	Values	Values Definition
Individual difference measure	The questionnaire used to measure the individual differences variable.	[string]	
Subscale	Indicates whether the specific effect size of the Individual difference is calculated based on scores in a specific subscale. TRUE = The specific effect size of the Individual difference is calculated based on scores in a specific subscale, FALSE = The specific effect size of the Individual difference is not calculated based on scores in a specific subscale	[bool]	
Individual difference level	Agents were classified according to a specific individual difference measure that could be measured (e.g., via a questionnaire) or manipulated (elicited experimentally). Each study might have its own grouping criterion (e.g., via a median split).	Low	Participants were classified as low according to the specific individual difference
		Medium	Participants were classified as medium according to the specific individual difference
		High	Participants were classified as high according to the specific individual difference
SVO type	Participants were classified according to the specific type of social value orientation that resulted in the SVO measure.	Prosocial	Prosocials aim to equalize and/or maximize joint outcomes
		Proself	Individualists (who aim to maximize their own outcomes, regardless of the others' outcomes) and competitors (who aim to maximize the relative difference between their own and the others' outcomes) are often combined in a proself category
		Individualist	Individualists aim to maximize their own outcomes, regardless of the others' outcomes
		Competitor	Competitors aim to maximize the relative difference between their own and the others' outcome

Concept	Concept Definition	Values	Values Definition
		Altruist	Altruists are more concerned with a positive outcome for others than for themselves (Bogaert, Boone, & Declerck, 2008)
		Unclassified	Participants could not be classified into any of the SVO types. It is common when using triple dominance measures.
Intergroup Competition			
Intergroup competition	A setting whereby multiple groups each experience a social dilemma, incentive structures can promote that groups compete for better outcomes (e.g., the group with better outcomes receives higher earnings), and/or group outcomes of the dilemmas are compared to each other (which can facilitate intergroup competition).	Individual group	Group of individuals making decisions that only affect that group
		Intergroup competition	Two groups and the higher earning group wins, or earns more
		Intergroup comparison	Two groups and the outcomes of the two groups are compared, but no tangible consequence results from the comparison
		Intergroup conflict	two groups and cooperating with own group, harms other group
		Intergroup harmony	Two groups and decisions to cooperate within either group benefit both groups

Concept	Concept Definition	Values	Values Definition
		Intergroup Prisoner's Dilemma	"The individuals' payoff for defecting or withholding contribution is higher than his or her payoff for contribution, regardless of what all others (ingroup and outgroup) players do. Withholding contribution, in other words, is the dominant individual strategy. The payoff for i when all in-group members contribute is higher than i's payoff when none contributes, regardless of the number of out-group contributors. Thus, the dominant group strategy is for all group members to contribute. Player i's payoff when all players in both groups contribute is lower than his or her payoff when none contributes. This means that the collectively (i.e., Pareto) optimal outcome, the one that maximizes the collective payoff to all players in both groups, is for all of them to withhold contribution" (Goren & Bornstein, 2000, p. 701).
Institution			
Rebate vs refund	Participants are given back (some of) their contributions to the public good, if the public good is not provided (or their partner chooses not to cooperate).	Absent	No refund/rebate is provided
		Full Refund	Participants are fully refunded any amount to contributed to the public good, often depending on contributions made by others
		Partial Rebate	Participants receive a partial refund (i.e., rebate) for their contribution to the public good, often depending on contributions made by others

Concept	Concept Definition	Values	Values Definition
Institutional Choice			
Institutional choice	Whether participants can choose an institution (such as punishment, reward).	Exogenous	With exogenous institutions, the structure of the game is given and cannot be changed by players
		Endogenous	With endogenous institutions, participants can influence the type of institution provided
Institutional choice mechanism	Endogenous institutions can be established by the participants themselves, such as with a vote or migrating to groups with different institutions.	Vote	Participants can establish different institutions by vote, requiring some threshold (simple majority, consensus, etc.)
		Migration	Participants can choose between groups with different institutions
		Choice	Individual participants can choose to impose an institution on themselves or others.
Institution type	The type of institution that can be established.	Punishment	Punishment is the imposition of negative payoffs on a specific participant after a trial in the game
		Reward	Reward is the imposition of positive payoffs on a specific participant after a trial in the game
		Taxation	Mandatory minimum contributions or taxation set that participants must make. Taxation is institutional (i.e., the threshold is set by an institution)
		Leadership	There is a person in the dilemma known as the leader who has a specific role and can influence followers
		Ostracism	Participants can be avoided or rejected from a group
		Other	Any other institution
Vote target	Whether the vote is to establish a new institution or to remove an existing institution.	Establish	Vote to establish a new institution
		Remove	Vote to remove an existing institution
		Other	Other votes (e.g., alter an existing institution)

Concept	Concept Definition	Values	Values Definition
Vote outcome	Whether the vote resulted in the targeted outcome or did not result in the targeted outcome.	Yes Vote	The proposal reached the threshold (the institution was established, removed, altered, etc.)
		No Vote	The proposal did not reach the threshold (the institution was not established, removed, altered, etc.)
Intentions			
Intentions	Correlation between cooperation and intentions participants are requested to state before making a decision in the game.	[bool]	-
Leadership			
Leadership	There is a person in the game that is recognized as the leader who has specific roles that can influence followers. TRUE = A leader is present in the game, FALSE = A leader is absent in the game.	[bool]	-
Leadership role	Participant is assigned to being the Leader or the Follower.	Leader	Leader behavior in the game
		Follower	Follower behavior in the game
Endogenous leadership	Participants are able to select the leader versus the leader is assigned by the experimenter or some other external mechanism.	Exogenous	Leader is assigned by the experimenter or some external mechanism
		Endogenous	Leader is selected by participants in the game
Leadership assignment rule	People use a specific rule to select leaders.	Random Appointment	Leader is randomly appointed
		Elected	Leader is voted and elected by other participants
		Fixed	Leader is fixed throughout the game
		Rotating	Leader position rotates within the group
		Authority	Leader is selected by an authority figure (or by being an authority figure)
		Volunteer	Participants volunteer to be the leader
		Other	Other unclassified rules to select leaders

Concept	Concept Definition	Values	Values Definition
Leader's behavior	Leaders has behaved in a specific way in the game.	Cooperative	Leader behaved cooperatively in the game
		Noncooperative	Leader behaved noncooperatively in the game
		Absent	Information was not provided to participants about how the leader behaved in the game
Leader's characteristic	Leader has a specific quality or style that is measured or manipulated in the study.	Male	Leader was male
		Female	Leader was female
		Strong	Leader was strong (e.g., a stronger influence on followers)
		Weak	Leader was weak (e.g., a weaker influence on followers)
		Positive emotion	Leader expressed positivity
		Negative emotion	Leader expressed negativity
		Ingroup	Leader was an ingroup member
		Outgroup	Leader was an outgroup member
Matching			
*Matching	How participants are paired with others during interactions.	Stranger	Participants interact with one person for one trial (i.e., one-shot), or switch partners after each trial across many trials (i.e., one-shot repeated)
		Partner	Participants interact with the same partner for multiple trials
		Partner's choice	Partner choice involves matching of participants based on either the players' or the experimenter's decision. If partner choice is in place, code for Partner choice
Partner choice	Matching of participants based on either the players' or the experimenter's decision.	Endogenous	Players choose with whom to interact
		Exogenous	Players are matched based on some (non-random) characteristic (e.g., personality, prior play)
		Migration	Players can choose to enter different groups (but not specific players, as all players can migrate)

Concept	Concept Definition	Values	Values Definition
Monitoring			
Costly monitoring	Ordinarily, feedback is available to players without cost. Costly monitoring refers to design in which players must pay a fee to access information, typically about the contributions of other players. TRUE = Costly monitoring, FALSE = Free monitoring.	[bool]	-
Monitoring cost	The cost of accessing information about other players' contributions	None	Free monitoring
		Low	Low monitoring cost
		Medium	Medium monitoring cost
		High	High monitoring cost
Motivational Orientation			
Motivational orientation	Participants were instructed to adopt a specific goal when interacting in the game.	Cooperative	Cooperative goals aim to equalize and/or maximize joint outcomes
		Individualistic	Individualistic goals aim to maximize own outcomes, regardless of the others' outcomes
		Competitive	Competitive goals aim to maximize the relative difference between own and the others' outcome
Endogenous motivational orientation	Participants have adopted a specific goal when interacting in the game (both as result of self report measures and classified as such based on behavior in other tasks). Some studies falling into this category allow participants to select the goal they want to pursue among a set of possible goals.	Cooperative	Cooperative goals aim to equalize and/or maximize joint outcomes
		Individualistic	Individualistic goals aim to maximize own outcomes, regardless of the others' outcomes
		Competitive	Competitive goals aim to maximize the relative difference between own and the others' outcome

Concept	Concept Definition	Values	Values Definition
Noise			
Noise	Whether there is a mismatch (either positive or negative) between participants intended behavior and actual behavior communicated to one's partner. TRUE = Presence of a mismatch (either positive or negative) between participants intended behavior and actual behavior communicated to one's partner, FALSE = Absence of a mismatch (either positive or negative) between participants intended behavior and actual behavior communicated to one's partner.	[bool]	-
Normative Behavior			
Descriptive norm	Participants are provided information about how others typically behave in the game.	Low Cooperation	Participants are told that people often displayed relatively low cooperation
		Medium Cooperation	Participants are told that people often displayed relatively medium amounts of cooperation
		High Cooperation	Participants are told that people often displayed relatively high amounts of cooperation
		No Information	Participants are not provided information about how others have previously behaved in the game
Group variability	Participants are given information about the variability in group member behavior.	Low	Participants are told there is relatively low amounts of variability in group member behavior
		Medium	Participants are told there is relatively medium amounts of variability in group member behavior
		High	Participants are told there is relatively high amounts of variability in group member behavior

Concept	Concept Definition	Values	Values Definition
Normative Beliefs			
Normative beliefs	Correlation between cooperation and participants' beliefs about what others expect them to do.	[bool]	-
Ostracism			
Ostracism	Participants could be avoided or rejected from a group. TRUE = Potential for ostracism was present, FALSE = Potential for ostracism was absent.	[bool]	-
Partner type			
Partner type	The type of partner that interacts with the participant in the game.	Peer	Other player(s) of the same role as the participant (unless the participant is a Leader)
		Leader	A person with some form of power over the other players
		Network	A peer in a game with network structure
		Experimenter	The person in charge of running the experiment (such as the principle investigator, research assistant)
		Third Party	A person who does not interact with the participant in the main game, e.g. a third-party punisher
		Institution	Institutional mechanism inside (e.g., impersonal sanctioning system) or outside (e.g., public institutions like government)
		Computer	Computerized opponent. Players must be informed to be interacting with a computer
		Other	Partner types not included in the other categories
		Stranger	General others outside the game (in formulations such as 'most people'; 'others in general'...)
		Unspecified	The type is not specified

Concept	Concept Definition	Values	Values Definition
Partner(s)' strategies			
Iterated strategy	The specific strategy played by the participant's partner in an iterated game.	Tit-for-Tat	The partner cooperates on the first trial, then copies the previous choices of the focal participant on each subsequent trial
		Tit-for-Tat+1	The partner cooperates on the first trial, and then copies the choices of the focal participant with a delay (i.e., cooperates when the focal agent cooperates, but defects only after two consecutive defections from the focal participant)
		GRIM	Initially, a partner using grim trigger will cooperate, but as soon as the participant defects (thus satisfying the trigger condition), a partner using grim trigger will defect for the remainder of the iterated game.
		Other	Other strategies
		Preprogrammed Cooperation Rate	The partner cooperates randomly with a given cooperation rate across the duration of the game
		Predominantly Cooperative	Partner cooperates over most trials, but the study doesn't specify the exact rate
		Predominantly Competitive	Partner competes over most trials, but the study doesn't specify the exact rate
		Unspecified	The paper reports that the partner(s) was following a strategy, but does not specify which one
		Pavlov	The partner cooperates with probability 0.5 in the first move, then cooperates if and only if both players opted for the same choice in the previous trial
		Real Partner	No experimental strategy is used and participants are playing according to actual game choices

Concept	Concept Definition	Values	Values Definition
		Extortionate Zero Determinant	Extortionate strategies have three properties: (1) they enforce a linear relationship between the player's own payoff and the opponent's payoff; (2) they prescribe to cooperate sufficiently often, such that the opponent's best response is to be fully cooperative; (3) at the same time, extortioners aim to cooperate less often than their opponent, to gain higher payoffs
		Generous Zero Determinant	Generous ZD strategies share the first two properties of extortioners: they enforce a linear relationship between the payoffs of the two players, and they provide incentives for the opponent to cooperate. However, as opposed to extortioners who aim to outcompete their opponents, the payoff of generous players never exceeds the payoff of the co-player
		GRIT	GRIT strategy involves a statement of intent prior to interaction, specific announcements of choices prior to making their choice, and some retaliation in response to being exploited.
Iterated pre-programmed cooperation rate	The pre-programmed cooperation rate of a partner (0.5 is 'random').	[double]	-
Iterated pre-programmed cooperation rate level	Relative level of the pre-programmed cooperation rate of a partner.	Low	Low relative level of the pre-programmed cooperation rate of a partner
		Medium	Medium relative level of the pre-programmed cooperation rate of a partner
		High	High relative level of the pre-programmed cooperation rate of a partner

Concept	Concept Definition	Values	Values Definition
One-shot strategy	The specific choice made by the participant's partner in a sequential one-shot game.	Prior Contribution	Target agent made a contribution (value to be specified in One-shot strategy value) or cooperated
		Prior Withdrawal	Target agent made a withdrawal (value to be specified in One-shot strategy value) or defected
One-shot strategy value	The contribution or withdrawal of the participant's partner when one-shot strategy is prior contribution or prior withdrawal (1 indicates full cooperation from the partner, while 0 indicates full defection).	[double]	-
Perception of the partner(s)			
Partner perception	How participants perceive partner(s) in the game according to several characteristics (usually, self-reported).	Prosocial/Trustworthy	Partner is perceived to be prosocial/trustworthy
		Proself/Untrustworthy	Partner is perceived to be proself/untrustworthy
		Attractive	Partner is perceived to be physically attractive
		Unattractive	Partner is perceived to be physically unattractive
		Negative	Partner is generally perceived with a negative connotation (coded when the other categories did not apply)
		Positive	Partner is generally perceived with a positive connotation (coded when the other categories did not apply)
		Warm	Partner is perceived to be warm
		Competent	Partner is perceived to be competent
		Moral	Partner is perceived to be moral
		Control	Partner is perceived to be controlling
		Dominant	Partner is perceived to be dominant
		Familiar	Partner is perceived to be familiar
		Close	Partner is perceived to be close
		Liking	Participants report to like the partner

Concept	Concept Definition	Values	Values Definition
		Status	Participants are perceived to have a relative social or professional standing
Partner perception level	To what extent the partner is perceived in reference to the quality indicated in Partner Perception.	Low	The partner is perceived as low in reference to a specific quality (this may be manipulated or measured in the study)
		High	The partner is perceived as high in reference to a specific quality (this may be manipulated or measured in the study)
		Control	A control condition whereby no information is provided in reference to a specific quality
Similarity level	The level of similarity between the participant and their partner on a relevant dimension (usually self-reported).	Low	The similarity between the participant and their partner(s) is low
		Medium	The similarity between the participant and their partner(s) is medium
		High	The similarity between the participant and their partner(s) is high
Gender of the partner	Partner's gender as reported in the paper. Positive correlations effect size always mean that participants cooperated more with men than with women.	M	Male
		F	Female
Period			
Trial of cooperation	Trial on which cooperation is assessed.	[int]	-
Trial of cooperation (ordinal)	Trial on which cooperation is assessed on an ordinal scale.	First	Cooperation assessed in the first trial
		Last	Cooperation assessed in the last trial
		Other	Cooperation assessed in a different trial than the first or last

Concept	Concept Definition	Values	Values Definition
Block of cooperation	Block on which cooperation is assessed. Blocks are defined as chunks of trials aggregated together. Trials can be grouped in a block based on some manipulation in the game, but can also be aggregated based on arbitrary reasons not related to the study design (e.g., statistical analyses).	[int]	-
Block of cooperation (ordinal)	Block on which cooperation is assessed on an ordinal scale. Blocks are defined as chunks of trials aggregated together. Trials can be grouped in a block based on some manipulation in the game, but can also be aggregated based on arbitrary reasons not related to the study design (e.g., statistical analyses).	First	Cooperation assessed in the first block
		Last	Cooperation assessed in the last block
		Other	Cooperation assessed in a different block than the first or last
Physical Proximity			
Physical proximity	Participants were placed at difference physical distances during the game.	Low	Participants were placed at a relatively low physical distance during the game
		Medium	Participants were placed at a relatively medium physical distance during the game
		High	Participants were placed at a relatively high physical distance during the game

Concept	Concept Definition	Values	Values Definition
Political Ideology			
Political ideology	Correlation between cooperation and self-reported political orientation. Lower scores represent left-wing/liberal/democratic ideologies, while higher scores represent right-wing/conservative/republican ideology.	[bool]	-
Power			
Power level	The level of relative social power held by the participant. Power is defined as the asymmetric control over one's own or other's resources.	Low	The participant has less control over resources relative to another person.
		High	The participant has more control over resources relative to another person
		Control	The participant has equal control over resources relative to another person.
Power type	Specific type of power that was manipulated within a study.	Conceptual	Conceptual manipulations of power involve semantically or visually priming the concept of power (e.g. through word puzzles or scrambled-sentence tasks) (Nieper et al., 2018)
		Physical	Physical manipulations of power involve an individual's physical posture or nonverbal behavior (e.g. power posing) (Nieper et al., 2018)
		Structural	Structural manipulations of power involve varying control over one's own or others' resources (e.g., having more points to invest in a game or having stronger punishment ratios) (Nieper et al., 2018)
		Experiential	Experiential manipulations of power activate the experience of power via an episodic recall or an imagined role manipulation (e.g., recalling a time when one felt powerful, or imagining alternatives) (Nieper et al., 2018)

Concept	Concept Definition	Values	Values Definition
Power manipulation method	The basis of power differences in the game.	Alternative	When interacting with others, the person with a better alternative is less dependent on the other person that they are interacting with and thus more powerful (Nieper et al., 2018)
		Endowment	One party has more resources available relative to another party in an interdependent situation. The one with more resources has more control over the outcome of the other and is thus more powerful (Nieper et al., 2018)
		Punishment	In interdependent situations, if one party can punish or has a better punishment ratio in comparison to others with no/less punishment power, the person with the better ratio, is more powerful (Nieper et al., 2018)
		Role Assignment	A participant is assigned a role for the task that is either associated with high power (e.g. leader, boss) or low power (e.g. follower, subordinate) (Nieper et al., 2018)
		Recall	Participants recall a time when they were powerful (Nieper et al., 2018)
		Benefit	One party gains a greater benefit from the outcomes of the game (e.g., higher return from the public goods, higher MPCR, higher rewards in the PDG)

Concept	Concept Definition	Values	Values Definition
Preferences for Conditional Cooperation			
Preference for conditional cooperation	Participants are classified as having a specific dispositional strategy of cooperation using a strategy method (see Fischbacher et al. 2001).	Freeriders	Using the strategy method of contributions to public goods by Fischbacher et al. (2001), participants who always contributed nothing to the public good
		Conditional cooperators	Using the strategy method of contributions to public goods by Fischbacher et al. (2001), participants who had an increasing amount of contributions or had a significant positive slope of own contribution with average group contribution
		Hump-shaped contributors	Using the strategy method of contributions to public goods by Fischbacher et al. (2001), participants who initially provide increasing amounts to the public good according to increasing average group contributions, but then at some point give a significantly decreasing amount to the public good
		Others	Using the strategy method of contributions to public goods by Fischbacher et al. (2001), participants unable to be classified as (un)conditional cooperators, free riders or hump shaped contributors
		Unconditional cooperator	Using the strategy method of contributions to public goods by Fischbacher et al. (2001), participants who always contributed the full amount to the public good
Priming			
Primed construct	Participants were primed with a specific construct.	Neutral	No prime or a neutral prime
		Cooperation	A prime that may increase cooperation; includes primes about the concept of cooperation, community, interdependence, shared identity

Concept	Concept Definition	Values	Values Definition
		Competition	A prime that may increase non-cooperation; such as conflict, business or economic context
		Morality	A prime that relates to the concept of morality
		Power	A prime that relates to the concept of power
		Religion	A prime that relates to religion
		Other	Other primes
Public Goods Game			
*Endowment size	Number of tokens participants were endowed with in a Public Goods Game.	[int]	-
Endowment level	Relative level of tokens participants were endowed with in a Public Goods Game. Each study can have its own criterion for grouping the endowments into levels.	Low	Low relative level of tokens participants were endowed with in the game
		Medium	Medium relative level of tokens participants were endowed with in the game
		High	High relative level of tokens participants were endowed with in the game

Concept	Concept Definition	Values	Values Definition
Symmetric endowment	Whether all participants within a group receive the same or different endowments. TRUE = All participants in the group receive the same endowment, FALSE = Participants within a group receive different endowments	[bool]	-
Assigned endowment	Whether the endowment is exogenously assigned at the beginning of the game. TRUE = The endowment is assigned exogenously at the beginning of the game, FALSE = The endowment is not assigned at the beginning of the game. It can be determined based on performance on a prior task (e.g., earned), or based on other mechanisms.	[bool]	-
Private account return	Private gain for each token contributed to the Private Account.	[double]	-
Private account return level	Relative level of the private gain for each token contributed to the Private Account.	Low	Low relative level of the private gain for each token contributed to the Private Account
		Medium	Medium relative level of the private gain for each token contributed to the Private Account
		High	High relative level of the private gain for each token contributed to the Private Account

Concept	Concept Definition	Values	Values Definition
Symmetric private account return	Whether all participants within a group receive the same or different private gain for each token contributed to the Private Account. TRUE = Symmetric private account return, FALSE = Asymmetric Private account return	[bool]	-
*MPCR	The ratio of benefits to costs for a member to contribute one monetary unit to the group account. Calculated as multiplier divided by group size.	[double]	-
MPCR level	Relative level of the ratio of benefits to costs for a member to contribute one monetary unit to the group account.	Low	Low relative level of the ratio of benefits to costs for a member to contribute one monetary unit to the group account
		Medium	Medium relative level of the ratio of benefits to costs for a member to contribute one monetary unit to the group account
		High	High relative level of the ratio of benefits to costs for a member to contribute one monetary unit to the group account

Concept	Concept Definition	Values	Values Definition
Individual MPCR	There exist differences between participant's return from the public good and other group members' return from the public good. How much a participant earns from a token contributed to the public good.	[double]	-
Individual MPCR level	Relative level of earnings participants gain from a token contributed to the public good, when there exist differences between participant's return from the public good and other group members' return from the public good.	Low	Low relative level of earnings participants gain from a token contributed to the public good, when there exist differences between participant's return from the public good and other group members' return from the public good
		Medium	Medium relative level of earnings participants gain from a token contributed to the public good, when there exist differences between participant's return from the public good and other group members' return from the public good
		High	High relative level of earnings participants gain from a token contributed to the public good, when there exist differences between participant's return from the public good and other group members' return from the public good

Concept	Concept Definition	Values	Values Definition
External MPCR	There is a difference between participant's return from the public good and other group members' return from the public good. How much group members earn from each token that a participant contributes to the public good.	[double]	-
External MPCR level	Relative level of earnings participants gain from a token contributed to the public good, when there is a difference between participant's return from the public good and other group members' return from the public good.	Low	Low relative level of earnings participants gain from a token contributed to the public good, when there is a difference between participant's return from the public good and other group members' return from the public good
		Medium	Medium relative level of earnings participants gain from a token contributed to the public good, when there is a difference between participant's return from the public good and other group members' return from the public good
		High	High relative level of earnings participants gain from a token contributed to the public good, when there is a difference between participant's return from the public good and other group members' return from the public good
MRS	Tradeoff between contribution and return from the public good, in order to keep the subjective utility constant.	[double]	-
MRS level	Relative level of the tradeoff between contribution and return from the public good, in order to keep the subjective utility constant.	Low	Low relative level of the tradeoff between contribution and return from the public good, in order to keep the subjective utility constant
		Medium	Medium relative level of the tradeoff between contribution and return from the public good, in order to keep the subjective utility constant
		High	High relative level of the tradeoff between contribution and return from the public good, in order to keep the subjective utility constant

Concept	Concept Definition	Values	Values Definition
Symmetric MPCR	Whether all participants within a group receive the same or different MPCR. TRUE = All participants within a group receive the same MPCR, FALSE = All participants within a group receive a different MPCR.	[bool]	-
Step return	Return for reaching the threshold in step-level Public Goods Game.	[double]	-
Step return level	Relative level of return for reaching the threshold in step-level Public Goods Game.	Low	Low relative level of return for reaching the threshold in step-level Public Goods Game
		Medium	Medium relative level of return for reaching the threshold in step-level Public Goods Game
		High	High relative level of return for reaching the threshold in step-level Public Goods Game
*Threshold	The minimum threshold of total contribution by all group members when the public good will be provided. This also defines the criticality of contributions, as contributions are more critical if other players cannot reach the threshold on their own (esp. in sequential games where others' prior contributions are known).	[int]	-
Threshold level	Relative level of the minimum threshold of total contribution by all group members when the public good will be provided. This also defines the criticality of contributions, as contributions are more critical if other players cannot reach the threshold on their own (esp. in sequential games where others' prior contributions are known).	Low	Low relative level of the minimum threshold of total contribution by all group members when the public good will be provided
		Medium	Medium relative level of the minimum threshold of total contribution by all group members when the public good will be provided
		High	High relative level of the minimum threshold of total contribution by all group members when the public good will be provided

Concept	Concept Definition	Values	Values Definition
Endogenous threshold	Whether the threshold is endogenously determined (e.g., through voting by participants). TRUE = Endogenous threshold, FALSE = Exogenous threshold.	[bool]	-
Punishment			
Punishment agent	Who can enact punishment on other participants (See Agent type).	Peer	Other participants of the same role
		Leader	A participant with some form of higher, relative social power; see Power
		Network	A peer in a game with network structure
		Experimenter	The person in charge of running the experiment (e.g., principle investigator, research assistant)
		Third Party	A person who does not interact with the participants in the main game e.g., a third-party punisher
		Institution	Institutional mechanism inside (e.g., impersonal sanctioning system) or outside (e.g., public institutions like government)
		Computer	Computerized opponent, and players were informed to be interacting with a computer
		Other	Other agent types not included in the current categories
Punishment incentive	The form in which participants' punishment decisions affect their partner's payoffs (see game incentive).	Hypothetical	Hypothetical value for participants (e.g., points)
		Monetary	An amount of money often converted from game points
		Non-monetary Material	Amount of other resources (e.g., candies, school supplies)
		Non-monetary Social	Participants receive social incentives, such as blame or praise, from others based on the outcomes of the game

Concept	Concept Definition	Values	Values Definition
Lottery punishment incentive	Whether there was a chance of lottery for punishment to be enforced (see lottery incentive). TRUE = A lottery was implemented for punishment to be enforced, FALSE = A lottery was not implemented for punishment to be enforced.	[bool]	-
Sequential punishment	Whether group members make their punishment decisions simultaneously or sequentially, i.e., whether players take decisions one after another while receiving some form of feedback on preceding decisions (see Sequentiality).	Simultaneous	Players make the punishment decision at the same time (i.e., without receiving information about others' punishment decisions on that trial)
		Sequential turn-taking	Each player makes a punishment decision in turn
		Sequential leadership-by-example	In a game with leadership by example, there is a single privileged player that makes a punishment decision before all others
Punishment effectiveness	The ratio of the cost of punishment for the participant who decides to punish, to the cost of punishment for the participant who receives the punishment (e.g., if punishment costs 1 point to inflict a cost of 3 points, = .33).	[double]	-
Punishment probability	The probability that a punishment decision is meted out (and thus becomes costly to the punished agent).	[double]	-
Punishment rule	A rule according to which some number of players are punished.	None	No punishment rule
		Contribution-based	Players who made a contribution less (or more) than a specified amount are punished
		Rank-based	The n lowest- (or highest-) ranked players are punished
		Outcome-based	Some set of players is punished if a collective threshold is (not) reached
		Random	Random players are punished

Concept	Concept Definition	Values	Values Definition
Punishment distribution rule	A rule according to which the amount deducted from the account of the punished participant is redistributed or destroyed.	Redistributive	The amount deducted from the account of a punished participant is redistributed to some or all of the other participants in the game
		Deductive	The amount deducted from the account of a punished participant is destroyed
Punishment iterations	The number of iterations of punishment per punishment phase.	[int]	-
*Punishment treatment	Punishment is the (possible) imposition of negative payoffs on a specific participant after the regular round of play.	-1	The baseline treatment. This is the treatment compared against any treatment coded as punishment treatment (= 1 identifies the punishment effect). This means that the treatment is equal to the punishment treatment, except for the availability of punishment (which includes other concepts that are part of punishment, such as punishment effectiveness, etc.)
		1	The punishment treatment
		0	Is not a punishment treatment. This is any treatment that is neither a punishment treatment nor a baseline relative to the punishment treatment (In practice, these are ignored in the platform)
Focal participant has punished	Whether the focal participant punished another player in the previous round. TRUE = Focal participant punished another player in the previous round, FALSE = Focal participant did not punish another player in the previous round.	[bool]	-
Real partner			
*Real partner	Whether participants interact with real or imagined participants in the game.	Hypothetical	Participants imagined interactions with others or played with a computer
		Real	Participants involved in real-time interactions with real participant(s)

Concept	Concept Definition	Values	Values Definition
		Deception	Participants believe that they are interacting with real participants, but experimenter strategy was used
Religiosity			
Religiosity	Correlation between any individual difference construct pertaining to the religious sphere (e.g., beliefs in god, church attendance, religious affiliation) and cooperation.	[bool]	-
Religious exposure level	Whether participants were exposed to a high versus low level of religious content (e.g., enrolled to a religious vs non-religious school).	Low	Participants were classified as having a relative low religious exposure
		Medium	Participants were classified as having a relative medium religious exposure
		High	Participants were classified as having a relative high religious exposure
Religiosity operationalization	How is the specific construct pertaining to the religious sphere operationalized in the study.	Religious affiliation	Participants reported to be affiliated to a specific religion
		Religious setting	Participants interacted in a religious setting (e.g., church)
		Religiosity	Participants reported beliefs toward the religious sphere (e.g., beliefs in God, extent to which they consider themselves as religious)
		Religious beliefs	Participants reported beliefs toward the religious sphere (e.g., beliefs in God, extent to which they consider themselves as religious)
		Religious attendance	Participants reported the frequency of attending religious services (e.g., going to church)
Reputation			
Gossip	People were allowed to share evaluations to others about their partners behavior.	Present	Gossip was present in the study
		Absent	Gossip was absent in the study

Concept	Concept Definition	Values	Values Definition
Knowledge of partner's prior behavior	Participants were provided information about how their partner behaved previously in the current game or had behaved with others in a previous game (another closely related coding is feedback).	Cooperative	Participants were provided with the information that their partner behaved cooperatively
		Noncooperative	Participants were provided with the information that their partner behaved noncooperatively
		Absent	Participants were not provided information about how their partner behaved in the current game or had behaved with others in a previous game
		Present	Participants were provided information about how their partner behaved in the current game or had behaved with others in a previous game
Partner selection	Participants can be chosen for interactions based on past behavior.	Present	Participants can be chosen for interactions based on past behavior
		Absent	Participants can not be chosen for interactions based on past behavior
Anonymity manipulation	Degree to which participants' actions were identifiable by their partner(s) and/or the experimenter.	Low	The treatment was classified as having a relative low level of anonymity
		Medium	The treatment was classified as having a relative medium level of anonymity
		High	The treatment was classified as having a relative high level of anonymity

Concept	Concept Definition	Values	Values Definition
Anonymity	Correlation between cooperation and individual differences in the extent that participants felt anonymous when making their decisions (higher scores equal more anonymity, lower identifiability).	[bool]	-
Resource Dilemma Game			
Resource size	Overall size of the resource that participants can withdraw in a resource dilemma game.	[int]	-
Resource size level	Relative size of the resource that participants can withdraw in a resource dilemma game.	Low	Low relative size of the resource that participants can withdraw in a resource dilemma game
		Medium	Medium relative size of the resource that participants can withdraw in a resource dilemma game
		High	High relative size of the resource that participants can withdraw in a resource dilemma game
Fixed resource	Whether the size of the resource is fixed or changes each trial based on the previous withdrawals decisions. TRUE = the resource is fixed, FALSE = changes each trial based on the previous withdrawals decisions.	[bool]	-
Partitioned resource	Whether participants are provided with a partitioned resource (e.g., the resource is already divided by the number of participants, which makes easier to withdraw an equal share). TRUE = The resource is presented as partitioned, FALSE = the resource was not partitioned.	[bool]	-
Replenishment rate	The replenishment rate in the resource dilemma. The remaining resource in the common pool is multiplied by the replenishment rate after each trial.	[double]	-
Replenishment rate level	Relative level of the replenishment rate in the resource dilemma.	Low	Low relative level of the replenishment rate in the resource dilemma
		Medium	Medium relative level of the replenishment rate in the resource dilemma

Concept	Concept Definition	Values	Values Definition
		High	High relative level of the replenishment rate in the resource dilemma
Re-Start Effect			
Restart	Observed cooperation in the last round of a block of trials compared to the first trial of the subsequent block.	Last	Last trial of previous block
		First	First trial of subsequent block
Reward			
Reward agent	Who can enact reward on other participants (See Agent type).	Peer	Other participants of the same role
		Leader	A participant with some form of higher, relative social power; see Power
		Network	A peer in a game with network structure
		Experimenter	The person in charge of running the experiment (e.g., principle investigator, research assistant)
		Third Party	A person who does not interact with the participants in the main game e.g., a third-party punisher
		Institution	Institutional mechanism inside (e.g., impersonal sanctioning system) or outside (e.g., public institutions like government)
		Computer	Computerized opponent, and players were informed to be interacting with a computer
		Other	Other agent types not included in the current categories
Reward incentive	The form in which participants' reward decisions affect their partner's payoffs (see game incentive).	Hypothetical	Hypothetical value for participants (e.g., points)
		Monetary	An amount of money often converted from game points
		Non-monetary Material	Amount of other resources (e.g., candies, school supplies)

Concept	Concept Definition	Values	Values Definition
		Non-monetary Social	Participants receive social incentives, such as blame or praise, from others based on the outcomes of the game
Lottery reward incentive	Whether there was a chance of lottery for a reward to occur (see lottery incentive). TRUE = A lottery was implemented for reward to occur, FALSE = A lottery was not implemented for reward to occur.	[bool]	-
Sequential reward	Whether group members make their reward decisions simultaneously or sequentially, i.e., whether players take decisions one after another while receiving some form of feedback on preceding decisions (see Sequentiality).	Simultaneous	Participants make the reward decision at the same time (i.e., without receiving information about others' reward decisions)
		Sequential turn-taking	Each participant makes a reward decision in turn
		Sequential leadership-by-example	In a game with leadership by example, there is a single privileged participant that makes a reward decision before all others
Reward effectiveness	The ratio of the cost of reward for the participant who decides to reward, to the benefit of reward for the participant who receives the reward (e.g., if the reward costs 1 point to deliver and benefits the recipient by 3 points, = .33).	[double]	-
Reward probability	The probability that a reward decision is played out (and thus becomes beneficial to the rewarded agent).	[double]	-
Reward rule		Contribution-based	Participants who made a contribution less (or more) than a specified amount are rewarded
		Rank-based	The n lowest- (or highest-) ranked participants are rewarded
		Outcome-based	Some set of players are rewarded if a collective threshold is (not) reached
		Random	Random players are rewarded

Concept	Concept Definition	Values	Values Definition
Reward iterations	The number of iterations of reward per reward phase.	[int]	-
*Reward treatment	Reward is the imposition of positive payoffs on a specific player after a trial of the game.	-1	The baseline treatment. This is the treatment compared against any treatment coded as reward treatment (= 1 identifies the reward effect). This means that the treatment is equal to the reward treatment, except for the availability of reward (which includes other concepts that are part of reward, such as reward effectiveness, etc.)
		1	The reward treatment
		0	Is not a reward treatment. This is any treatment that is neither a punishment treatment nor a baseline relative to the punishment treatment (In practice, these are ignored in the platform)
Focal participant has rewarded	Whether the focal participant rewarded another player in the previous trial of the game. TRUE = Focal participant rewarded another player in the previous trial, FALSE = Focal participant did not reward another player in the previous trial.	[bool]	-
Sequentiality			
*Sequentiality	Whether group members make their decisions simultaneously or sequentially, i.e., whether participants take decisions one after another while receiving some form of feedback about preceding decisions.	Simultaneous	Participants make decisions simultaneously
		Sequential turn-taking	Participants make decisions one after another following some (endogenous or exogenous) order

Concept	Concept Definition	Values	Values Definition
		Sequential leadership-by-example	One (endogenously or exogenously determined) participant makes a first decision, then all other participants make their decisions simultaneously. This does not include two-player sequential games, which should be coded as sequential turn-taking

Concept	Concept Definition	Values	Values Definition
Position in game	The positional order of the participant in the sequence of decisions (in a sequential game).	[int]	-
Endogenous position	Whether the position in the sequence is exogenous (i.e., predetermined) or endogenous (i.e., based on players' decisions). Endogenous could also be choosing that the game is sequential and/or choosing position in the game. TRUE = Endogenous, FALSE = Exogenous.	[bool]	-
Shadow of the Future			
Shadow of the future	Participants expect to have future interactions with the same person (or group) over time. TRUE = Expectations of future interactions with the same partner or group, FALSE = No expectations of future interactions with the same partner or group.	[bool]	-
Social Capital			
Social capital	Correlation between cooperation and individual differences in social capital measures, which capture the quality of the networks individuals are immersed in (e.g., volunteering, active participation in electoral process, number of friends). Although trust is defined as part of the social capital, it is currently coded separately as an individual difference (trust propensity) or state trust.	[bool]	-
Social capital level	Participants' were classified according to their social capital.	Low	Participants were classified as having a relative low social capital
		Medium	Participants were classified as having a relative medium social capital
		High	Participants were classified as having a relative high social capital

Concept	Concept Definition	Values	Values Definition
State Trust			
State trust	Correlation between cooperation and the extent to which participants report to trust the partner(s) in the game (expectations about others' behavior and a generalized propensity to trust are coded separately).	[bool]	-
State trust level	Participants' were classified according to their state trust.	Low	Participants were classified as having a relative low state trust
		Medium	Participants were classified as having a relative state trust
		High	Participants were classified as having a relative high state trust
Symmetry			
Symmetry target	How specific aspects of the game that were different (i.e., asymmetric) for participants.	Payoff matrix	The matrix that represents the possible behaviors and outcomes for the participants
		Marginal rate of substitution	Tradeoff between contribution and return from the public good, in order to keep the subjective utility constant
		MPCR	The ratio of benefits to costs for a member to contribute one monetary unit to the group account (calculated as multiplier divided by group size)
		Lottery prize	Bonuses that were allocated through a lottery-like mechanism (this bonus is additional to return from private and public goods accounts)
		Return from public account	Payoff obtained from the tokens invested in the public account
		Punishment effectiveness	The ratio of the cost of punishment to the punishing agent to the cost of punishment to the punished agent
		Payment chance	Chance to receive payment based on the outcome of the game

Concept	Concept Definition	Values	Values Definition
		Incentives	How participants' decisions in the game determine their payoffs in different forms
		Endowment	Number of tokens participants were endowed with in a Public Goods Game
		Private account return	Private gain for each token contributed to the private account
		Access to the resource	Maximum amount of resource that participants can harvest from the common pool
		Other	Other aspects of the game that was manipulated with respect to symmetry
*Symmetry	Whether specific aspects of the game that were different (i.e., asymmetric) for participants. TRUE = Symmetric, FALSE = Asymmetric.	[bool]	-
Synchrony			
Synchrony	Participants engage in a synchronous activity prior to making decisions in the game. TRUE = Participants engage in a synchronous activity prior to making decisions in the game, FALSE = Participants did not engage in a synchronous activity prior to making decisions in the game.	[bool]	-
Taxation			
Minimum contribution value	The value of the minimum contribution to the public good as a proportion of the endowment.	[double]	-
Minimum contribution level	The relative level of the minimum contribution to the public good as a proportion of the endowment.	Low	Low relative level of the minimum contribution to the public good as a proportion of the endowment
		Medium	Medium relative level of the minimum contribution to the public good as a proportion of the endowment
		High	High relative level of the minimum contribution to the public good as a proportion of the endowment

Concept	Concept Definition	Values	Values Definition
Minimum contribution	Mandatory minimum contributions or taxation set that minimum contribution players must make. Taxation is institutional, i.e., the threshold is set by an institution (this is different from pledges of contributions, which are coded as 'Communication').	None	No minimum contribution
		Mandatory Minimum	Minimum contribution is automatically contributed to the public good
		Suggested Minimum	A minimum contribution is suggested, but not automatically transferred. May be enforced (e.g., through punishment)
Income tax	Taxation on income takes a proportion of players' income (from public and private good, net of contributions) and redistributes it among players. Redistribution may be unequal. TRUE = Income tax exists, FALSE = No income tax exists.	[bool]	-
Income tax rate	The proportion of net income taken under the tax.	[double]	-
Income tax rate level	The relative level of the proportion of net income taken under the tax.	Low	Low relative level of the proportion of net income taken under the tax
		Medium	Medium relative level of the proportion of net income taken under the tax
		High	High relative level of the proportion of net income taken under the tax
Time Pressure			
Time pressure	Whether participants were instructed to make their decisions in a limited amount of time or with a longer amount of time.	Time pressure	Participants are given a limited amount of time and asked to make their decision as quickly as possible
		Time delay	Participants are given relatively more time to think carefully about their decision before making it
		Control	Participants do not receive any instructions regarding the time they have to spend to make a decision

Concept	Concept Definition	Values	Values Definition
Decision time (correlation)	Correlation between cooperation and time participants spend to make the decision.	[bool]	-
Decision time	Participants are categorized according to their decision time (e.g., using a median split).	Fast	Participants were categorized as fast in providing their decisions
		Slow	Participants were categorized as slow in providing their decisions
Uncertainty			
Uncertainty target	Whether participants receive uncertain information about a certain aspect of the game. This also includes receiving detailed vs less specific information, as well as events happening certainly versus events happening with a probability.	Endowment size	Information about maximum number of tokens participants were endowed with (or could contribute/harvest)
		Incentive structure	Information about how payoffs in the game are determined. Stochastic vs deterministic payoff structures are included in this category
		Feedback	information participants receive after each decision round
		Threshold	The minimum threshold of total contribution by all group members for the public good to be provided or the occurrence of a loss (e.g., in case of public bad games)
		Group size	Overall number of people affected by the outcome of the game
		Provision probability	Probability to obtain a group payoff as a result of the public goods allocation
		MPCR	The ratio of benefits to costs for a member to contribute one monetary unit to the group account
		Return from private account	Payoff obtained from the tokens invested in the private account
		Return from public account	Payoff obtained from the tokens invested in the public account

Concept	Concept Definition	Values	Values Definition
		Loss	Negative payoff that resulted in a loss of resources due to endogenous (e.g., not reaching a threshold) or exogenous (e.g., shocks) factors
		Replenishment rate	The replenishment rate in the resource dilemma. The remaining resource in the common pool is multiplied by the replenishment rate (≥1) after each trial
		Resource size	Overall size of the resource from which participants can make withdrawals in a resource dilemma game
		Other	Other uncertainty target not included in the existing categories
Uncertainty level	The relative level of uncertainty of the treatment.	Low	The treatment was classified as having a relative low level of uncertainty
		Medium	The treatment was classified as having a relative medium level of uncertainty
		High	The treatment was classified as having a relative high level of uncertainty
		Slow	Participants were categorized as slow in providing their decisions
Values			
Values (Schwartz)	Human values according to Schwartz classification.	Benevolence	Defining goal: preserving and enhancing the welfare of those with whom one is in frequent personal contact (Schwartz, 2012)
		Universalism	Defining goal: understanding, appreciation, tolerance, and protection for the welfare of all people and for nature (Schwartz, 2012)
		Self-direction	Defining goal: independent thought and action–choosing, creating, exploring (Schwartz, 2012)
		Stimulation	Defining goal: excitement, novelty, and challenge in life (Schwartz, 2012)

Concept	Concept Definition	Values	Values Definition
		Hedonism	Defining goal: pleasure or sensuous gratification for oneself (Schwartz, 2012)
		Achievement	Defining goal: personal success through demonstrating competence according to social standards (Schwartz, 2012)
		Power	Defining goal: social status and prestige, control or dominance over people and resources (Schwartz, 2012)
		Security	Defining goal: safety, harmony, and stability of society, of relationships, and of self (Schwartz, 2012)
		Conformity	Defining goal: restraint of actions, inclinations, and impulses likely to upset or harm others and violate social expectations or norms (Schwartz, 2012)
		Tradition	Defining goal: respect, commitment, and acceptance of the customs and ideas that one's culture or religion provides (Schwartz, 2012)
Other values	Values are abstract cognitive structures that indicate desirable ways of behaving in a broad range of situations (Rokeach, 1973; Schwartz, 1992).	[string]	-
Watching Eyes			
Watching eyes	Participants are exposed to cues resembling watching eyes while making their decision in the game. TRUE = Watching eyes present, FALSE = Watching eyes absent.	[bool]	-